Cryptography and game theory
Corresponding entry in Aachen Campus, Bonn Basis.
Responsible
Lecture
Yona Raekow and Konstantin Ziegler
Time & Place
12.3.-23.3.2012, B-IT Marschallsaal (and B-IT 1.25 on 23.3.2012)
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The tentative schedule for the two weeks is as follows:
Date | 9.00-10.30 | 11.00-12.30 | 12.30-13.30 | 13.30-15.00 |
12.03. | Lecture 1 | Lecture 2 | Lunch break | Tutorial 1 |
13.03. | Lecture 3 | Lecture 4 | Lunch break | Tutorial 2 |
14.03. | no lecture | |||
15.03. | Lecture 5 | Lecture 6 | Lunch break | Tutorial 3 |
16.03. | Lecture 7 | Lecture 8 | ||
17.03. | weekend | |||
18.03 | weekend | |||
19.03. | Lecture 9 | Lecture 10 | Lunch break | Tutorial 4 |
20.03. | Lecture 11 | Lecture 12 | Lunch break | Tutorial 5 |
21.03. | no lecture | |||
22.03. | Lecture 13 | Lecture 14 | Lunch break | Tutorial 6 |
23.03 | Wrap up | Exam preparation | ||
Allocation
2+2 SWS, 4 credits ECTS
Contents
Cryptography and game theory both deal with the design and analysis of protocols, also called mechanisms, for the interaction of parties with conflicting interests. However, both disciplines have different origins and use different models and formalisms.
Cryptography considers "good" parties for whom basic properties such as secrecy, correctness, or authenticity should be guaranteed in the face of opposing "malicious" parties. For example, parties may communicate for the purpose of a function evaluation, a so called multi-party computation, where some of the parties may try to prevent a correct computation.
Game theory considers parties with individual goals and aims to design mechanisms of interaction that will lead to behaviors with desirable properties. Here, we can assume that every party will simply act according to its own set of goals, for example maximization of its monetary profit.
In this course we will explore recent results that arose from the cross fertilization of the two areas with the goal to arrive at a better understanding of collaboration between parties with conflicting interests.
Final Exam
Time and place: 30 March 2012, 9.00 am, at b-it Marschallsaal
Literature
- N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, V. V. Vazirani (eds.). Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- M. J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein. A course in game theory. MIT Press, 1994.
- R. Cramer, I. Damgård, J. B. Nielsen, Secure multiparty computation -- Book Draft, 2010.
Links