# Cryptography and game theory

Corresponding entry in Aachen Campus, Bonn Basis.

## Responsible

## Allocation

2+2 SWS, 4 credits ECTS

## Lecture

Yona Raekow and Konstantin Ziegler

## Time & Place

12.3.-23.3.2012, B-IT Marschallsaal (and B-IT 1.25 on 23.3.2012)

## The lecture's mailing list

Students interested in the course are invited to join the mailing list to receive up-to-date information:

You can subscribe to and unsubscribe from to the mailing list using the information given on the list's Info page.

The tentative schedule for the two weeks is as follows:

Date | 9.00-10.30 | 11.00-12.30 | 12.30-13.30 | 13.30-15.00 |

12.03. | Lecture 1 Scribe: Emil | Lecture 2 Scribe: Emil | Lunch break | Tutorial 1 |

13.03. | Lecture 3 Scribe: Niclas | Lecture 4 Scribe Niclas | Lunch break | Tutorial 2 |

14.03. | no lecture | |||

15.03. | Lecture 5 Scribe: Nevena | Lecture 6 Scribe: Nevena | Lunch break | Tutorial 3 |

16.03. | Lecture 7 Scribe: Nevena | Lecture 8 Scribe: Nevena | ||

17.03. | weekend | |||

18.03 | weekend | |||

19.03. | Lecture 9 Scribe: Emil | Lecture 10 Scribe: Niclas | Lunch break | Tutorial 4 |

20.03. | Lecture 11 Scribe: David | Lecture 12 Scribe: David | Lunch break | Tutorial 5 |

21.03. | no lecture | |||

22.03. | Lecture 13 Scribe: David | Lecture 14 Scribe: David | Lunch break | Tutorial 6 |

23.03 | Wrap up | Exam preparation |

Scribe notes for the lectures:

- lecture 1, lecture 2
- lecture 3 & 4
- lecture 5, lecture 6
- lecture 7 & 8
- lecture 9 & lecture 10
- lecture 11, lecture 12
- lecture 13, lecture 14

## Scribes

This class has no take-home assignments. Instead, you are required to write and hand-in scribe notes of lectures. You will be assigned a lecture that you should take notes for. (Depending on the number of participants this will happen in pairs, or may be assigned more than one lecture.) Scribe notes are due the monday after your assigned lecture. You have to submit a LaTeX file, named scribesNN.tex, where NN is the two-digit number of the lecture and a corresponding pdf.

Use the following LaTeX template. The scribe notes must be written in LaTeX. They will be made available to your fellow students via this web page. For this purpose you should put special care in producing well-written material. Each scribe-file for a class will be made available in pdf format and will carry the names of the authoring scribes.

### More information on LaTeX?

- LaTeX cookbook (in German)
- - Tobias Oetiker, [http://people.ee.ethz.ch/~oetiker/lshort/ The not so short introduction to LaTeX: lshort.pdf]

- George Gr\"atzer, More Math Into \LaTeX, 4th edition, Springer, 2007.

- AMS-LaTeX, [ftp://ftp.ams.org/pub/tex/doc/amsmath/amsldoc.pdf user's guide], [ftp://ftp.ams.org/pub/tex/doc/amscls/amsthdoc.pdf AMS theorem package user's guide],

- Michael Downes, [ftp://ftp.ams.org/pub/tex/doc/amsmath/short-math-guide.pdf Short math guide for LaTeX]

- UK TeX FAQ, www.tex.ac.uk/faq

- Marc Ensenbach and Marc Trettin, [http://mirror.ctan.org/info/l2tabu/german/l2tabu.pdf Das \LaTeX2e-S\"undenregister]

Links:

## Quizzes

Access the quizzes on this page. In order to do so, you need to sign up to this page by clicking on the key symbol on the left upper corner.

## Contents

Cryptography and game theory both deal with the design and analysis of protocols, also called mechanisms, for the interaction of parties with conflicting interests. However, both disciplines have different origins and use different models and formalisms.

Cryptography considers "good" parties for whom basic properties such as secrecy, correctness, or authenticity should be guaranteed in the face of opposing "malicious" parties. For example, parties may communicate for the purpose of a function evaluation, a so called multi-party computation, where some of the parties may try to prevent a correct computation.

Game theory considers parties with individual goals and aims to design mechanisms of interaction that will lead to behaviors with desirable properties. Here, we can assume that every party will simply act according to its own set of goals, for example maximization of its monetary profit.

In this course we will explore recent results that arose from the cross fertilization of the two areas with the goal to arrive at a better understanding of collaboration between parties with conflicting interests.

## Final Exam

Time and place: 30 March 2012, 9.00 am, at b-it Marschallsaal

## Literature

- N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, V. V. Vazirani (eds.). Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- M. J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein. A course in game theory. MIT Press, 1994.
- R. Cramer, I. Damgård, J. B. Nielsen, Secure multiparty computation -- Book Draft, 2010.

## Links