

Cryptography, winter 2006

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3. Exercise sheet (22.11.2006)

Hand in solutions to the homework exercises
on Wednesday, December 6th, in the tutorial/the lecture.

Exercise 3.1 (Repetition: Elementary stochastics).

On a conference on Internet security are 15% of the people cryptographers. 90% of the cryptographers drink coffee. In total 25% of the participants of the conference drink coffee. In the morning you see a person drinking coffee. What is the probability that this person is a cryptographer?

Solution. Let A be the event "A (uniformly) selected person is cryptographer" and B the event "A (uniformly) selected person drinks coffee". We know $\text{prob}(A) = 0.15$ and $\text{prob}(B) = 0.25$. It is given that $\text{prob}(B|A) = 0.9$. We want to know $\text{prob}(A|B)$. By Bayes theorem we have

$$\text{prob}(A|B) = \frac{\text{prob}(B|A) \cdot \text{prob}(A)}{\text{prob}(B)}$$

Thus we have $\text{prob}(A|B) = \frac{0.9 \cdot 0.15}{0.25} = 0.54$. ○

Exercise 3.2 (Modes of Operation).

Recall that S_n is the set of all bit permutations of the set $\{0, 1\}^n$. Let $\pi \in S_n$. Consider the following block cipher

$$\eta_\pi: \mathbb{Z}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_2^n, (x_0, \dots, x_{n-1}) \mapsto (x_{\pi(0)}, \dots, x_{\pi(n-1)})$$

Decrypt the ciphertext 101010101010 using ECB mode, CBC mode and OFB mode. Use the cipher defined above with block length 3 and key

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 2 & 3 \\ 2 & 1 & 3 \end{pmatrix}$$

The initialization vector is 000. For the OFB mode, use $r = 2$.

Solution. ECB: 011100011100, CBC: 011001001001, OFB: 101010101010 ○

Exercise 3.3 (Perfect secrecy: The Two Time Pad).

Show that the one-time pad is no longer unconditionally secure (perfect secrecy) if a key is used two (or more) times.

Solution. Let $m_1, m_2 \in \{0, 1\}^n$ be two messages of length n , and let $k \in \{0, 1\}^n$ be the key. Assume you observe two ciphertexts $c_1, c_2 \in \{0, 1\}^n$ with $c_i := m_i \oplus k$ for $i \in \{1, 2\}$. Then

$$c_1 \oplus c_2 = (m_1 \oplus k) \oplus (m_2 \oplus k) = m_1 \oplus m_2$$

Thus the observation of c_1 and c_2 leaks information on m_1 and m_2 . ○

Exercise 3.4 (Homework: Forging the IV).

(7 points)

Consider the following ASCII table

Binary	Decimal	Hexadecimal	Glyph
0100 0001	65	41	A
0100 0010	66	42	B
0100 0011	67	43	C
0100 0100	68	44	D
0100 0101	69	45	E
0100 0110	70	46	F
0100 0111	71	47	G
0100 1000	72	48	H
0100 1001	73	49	I
0100 1010	74	4A	J
0100 1011	75	4B	K
0100 1100	76	4C	L
0100 1101	77	4D	M
0100 1110	78	4E	N
0100 1111	79	4F	O
0101 0000	80	50	P
0101 0001	81	51	Q
0101 0010	82	52	R
0101 0011	83	53	S
0101 0100	84	54	T
0101 0101	85	55	U
0101 0110	86	56	V
0101 0111	87	57	W
0101 1000	88	58	X
0101 1001	89	59	Y
0101 1010	90	5A	Z

Assume you intercepted a message (m, IV) , $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$, $IV \in \{0, 1\}^{64}$ where the plaintext was encoded according to the above ASCII table and encrypted with the CBC mode of a block cipher with block length 64 bit and initialization vector $IV = 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA$ yielding m . Assume further you know that the plaintext of the message starts with the phrase DEAR SIR. Find an initialization vector IV' such that the decrypted message will start with DEAR MAM.

Solution.

MAM = 4D 41 4D = 01001101 01000001 01001101

SIR = 53 49 52 = 01010011 01001001 01010010

The modified initialization vector is

$$IV = 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAB4A2B4$$

Exercise 3.5 (Homework: Perfect Secrecy).

(5 points)

Prove that the Caesar cipher is not unconditionally secure.

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Solution. We consider a pair of ciphertext letters $(c_1, c_2) \in \mathbb{Z}_{26}^2$. The probability for a plaintext pair $(p_1, p_2) \in \mathbb{Z}_{26}^2$ with $c_1 - c_2 \neq p_1 - p_2 \pmod{26}$ is zero, the probability for a plaintext pair $(p_1, p_2) \in \mathbb{Z}_{26}^2$ with $c_1 - c_2 = p_1 - p_2 \pmod{26}$ is $1/26$. Thus the Caesar cipher is not unconditionally secure, whenever the plaintext has more than one letter. Otherwise we have perfect secrecy.

Exercise 3.6 (Homework: Modes of Operation).

(8 points)

Decrypt the ciphertext 111111111111 using ECB mode and CBC mode. Use the cipher defined in Exercise 3.2 with block length 3 and key

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$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 2 & 3 \\ 2 & 3 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

Solution. ECB: 111111111111, CBC: 111000000000