


$$\underline{\text{enc}_1(\text{enc}_2(\text{enc}_3(\text{text})))}$$



$$\text{enc}_i = \begin{cases} \text{RSA}(\text{text} \parallel \text{rnd}_i) \\ \text{ElGamal}_{\text{rnd}_i}(\text{text}) \end{cases}$$

$$\text{ElGamal: } (1, x) \mapsto (g^\tau, a^\tau x)$$

decryption

re-encryption

$$(g^G, a^G x) \mapsto (g^\tau, a^\tau x)$$

$\tau = G + \text{sk}_{\text{new}}$

$$x \xrightarrow{\text{enc}} (g^\tau, (a_1 \dots a_s)^\tau x)$$

$\downarrow \text{dec}_1$

$$(g^\tau, (a_2 \dots a_s)^\tau x)$$

$$a_i = g^{\alpha_i}, \prod a_i = g^{\sum \alpha_i}$$

$$x \mapsto (g^\tau, a_s^\tau x) \mapsto (g^{\tau_1}, a_{s-1}^\tau a_s^\tau x)$$

$x \xrightarrow{\text{enc}}$
 $\tau = \sigma + \rho$ (added of temp. secret randomness)

$$(g^\sigma, a^\sigma x) \xrightarrow{\text{renc}} (g^\tau, a^\tau x)$$

$$(g^\tau, (a^\tau x)) \xrightarrow{\text{dec}}$$

$$\frac{(a^\tau x)}{(g^\tau)^\alpha} \quad \boxed{a = g^\alpha}$$

where $\alpha = (a_1 \dots a_s)$

$$x \xrightarrow{\text{enc}} (g^\tau, a_1^\tau \cdot a_2^\tau \cdot \dots \cdot a_s^\tau \cdot x)$$

$$\downarrow \text{dec}_1 \leftarrow a_1 = g^{\alpha_1} : \boxed{(g^\tau)^{\alpha_1} = a_1^\tau}$$

$$(g^\tau, a_2^\tau \cdot \dots \cdot a_s^\tau \cdot x)$$


$$\downarrow \text{dec}_2$$

$$\prod a_i = g^{\sum \alpha_i}$$

$$\boxed{(g, g^\beta, g^\gamma) \xrightarrow{\text{DHP}} g^\delta, \delta = \beta\gamma}$$

$$a_s = g^{\alpha_s}$$

$$\left(\cancel{g^\tau}, x \right)$$



Success: $i=j$
 & never asked for decryption of x_0 or x_1 (or related)

$(g^\beta, a^T x_i)$

Security!

No such attacker exist.

For example: reduce ElGamal-sec to DDHP

Reducers:

$$(g, g^\beta, g^\gamma, g^\delta)$$

Q: $\delta = \beta \cdot \gamma$?

$$x_0 = g^{\alpha} x_1$$

$$g^{\alpha\tau} = g^{\beta\gamma}$$

$$x_1$$

Take $a (= g^\alpha) = g^\beta$

$t (= g^\tau) = g^\gamma$

$a^\tau = g^{\alpha\tau}$

$y (= a^\tau x) = g^\delta \cdot x_i$

Good in case
Bad otherwise

$$\delta = \beta\gamma$$

Attacker tells us j for which he thinks that $y = a^\tau x_j, t = g^\tau$.

Case $\delta = \beta\gamma$: Attacker succeeds \equiv we succeed.
100%

Output: Yes if $i = j$.

Case $\delta \neq \beta\gamma$ or easier to discuss: δ random.
 → Attacker's answer is only a guess.
 → Output is correct = 50%.

NOT SECURE \Rightarrow


DDH

solved.

$$g = h^{\frac{p-1}{q}}$$

\mathbb{Z}_p^* , p prime

h^{p-2} h h^2 h^3



h^{p-2} h h^2

