Equo ne credite: Trojans

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Abstract

Probably you already know this scenario: In your e-mail box is a message from a friend with an attached greeting card. You open this greeting card and it shows a nice picture of your friend in holiday. Some hours/-days later, your computer starts to do curious things. The DVD-ROM Drives opens or the screen gets blank, but you are sure you did nothing to cause this. Perhaps you activated a Trojan Horse by opening the e-mail attachment containing the greeting card from the friend mentioned before. Hopefully he just wants to play a trick on you and did not do harmful things to your computer or your personal data stored on the harddrive.

This paper deals with Trojan Horses, Malicious Software that can do many harmful things to a computer, once executed. We will see some examples of Trojan Horses to get a better understanding of what they are doing and how they work and a kind of historical overview. After that, we will formulate a precise definition and build up a characterisation of Trojan Horses. Later on, we will see how Trojan Horses in binary compiler implementations can pass nearly every state of the art compiler test, without being noticed. The last but one part will deal with a security framework to detect new Trojan Horses online at runtime and have a detailed look on the security monitor being used. The last part actually will sum up this paper.
1 Some examples of Trojan Horses and a little bit of history

1.1 Greek mythology

The name Trojan Horse comes from the Greek mythology. After ten years of siege in the Trojan war, the Greeks used a trick to win the battle against the Trojans, because they could not break the walls of Troy nor the gates. The Greeks built a huge wooden horse and in which their best soldiers were hidden. They said to the Trojans: "We can't defeat you within ten years and leave the battlefield now and give you this horse as a present." The Greek army left, but not so far away they waited until the night. In between the Trojans pulled the horse inside the city and made a big party and everyone got drunk. At night, when no Trojan was awake, the hidden Greek soldiers left the horse, opened the gate for the rest of the arriving army and so the Greek entered Troy and defeated the Trojans.

1.2 Back Orifice

This Remote Administration Trojan Horse (RAT) was developed by a group called "Cult of the dead cow" and published at DefCon 6 (a yearly conference of hackers in Las Vegas) in 1998. It affects Windows 95 and 98 operating systems and is a modularized system of plugins. So one can add a new functionality or feature easily by adding a new plugin.

After executing this program by the unsuspected victim, it sends his machines IP-address and port number via ICQ or IRC to the attacker. Then the attacker is able to build up a connection to the victims computer and send commands to the Back Orifice Trojan Horse. These commands are executed and any information requested by the attacker will be sent. As an example he can copy the victims entire hard drive or maybe even manipulate the data on this way. After doing his malicious things the attacker can send a clean up command that will remove all files and registry entries of Back Orifice, so that no one can decide whether Back Orifice was ever installed to the computer or not.

1.3 InCommand

InCommand is (like Back Orifice) a RAT affecting windows operating systems, containing a server part running on the victims machine and a client part, running on the attackers computer. With this interface the attacker can for example start an ftp server on the victims machine, or open his DVD-ROM drive, or turn off his monitor. More options you can find on Figure 1.

2 Definition of a Trojan Horse

In the last section we have seen some examples for Trojan Horses and got an understanding for what they are used for. Now we formulate a more precise definition.
2 DEFINITION OF A TROJAN HORSE

Figure 1: InCommand

Definition 1 (Trojan Horse) "An apparently useful and innocent program containing additional hidden code which allows the unauthorized collection, exploitation, falsification, or destruction of data."[6]

We see that in contrast to viruses Trojan Horses must not have a self reproduction method included. They must be run by the user, so the Trojan Horse program has the same privileges as the user. With administrator or root rights, there is no limit to the installation on a computer. You see, it is dangerous always to login as "Administrator" on a Windows machine to do every day tasks and maybe execute accidently a Trojan Horse.

2.1 Characterization

To distinguish different types of Trojan Horses we will now build up a characterization. We distinguish between: [1]

- Propagation Methods P
- Activation A
- Placement H
- Effectiveness E
- Communication C
- Functions F
- Guarding Mechanisms G

This allows us to describe every Trojan Horse as a tuple


where the Guarding Mechanism for every item can vary.
3 Trojan Horses in Compilers

Ken Thompson, the inventor of Unix, demonstrated on his Turing Award Lecture in 1984, how Trojan Horses can settle down in binary compiler implementations without being noticed by every state of the art compiler validation. For example like the Bootstrap Test, or any amount of source code inspection and verification. Thompson’s Trojan Horse was a C compiler, where the Trojan Horse was not visible in the compiler source code, but it was reproducing itself (with Trojan Horse) applied to the compiler source code. Compiling login.c intudes a backdoor into the Unix ”login” command. How is this possible? The Trojan Horse is not in the source code! Actually, the Trojan Horse was not in the source code what Thompson showed. We will now see how this is done.

3.1 Self reproducing by substitution

As a starter consider the following c program:

Listing 1: self reproducing program (by substitution) [3]

```c
main()
{
    char ∗b = "main()
    char ∗b = %c%s%c ;
    printf(b,34,b,34);
}"
; printf(b,34,b,34);
}
```

This program prints out it’s own source code. How is it done ? The %c means replacing a single character and %s an entire string. 34 is the ASCII value of ". The printf command prints out the string b and as additional parameters, replaces the next %c by 34("),%s by the string b itself and %c by 34 again.

3.2 Conditional self reproducing

Now we consider a program that only reproduces, if a special condition is fulfilled.

Listing 2: Conditional self reproducing[3]

```c
// file: reproduce.c
char ∗buf =""
// file: reproduce.c
char ∗buf = %c%s%c;
int main(int argc, char ∗argv[])
{
    int main(int argc, char ∗argv[]){
        if (argv[1] && (strcmp(argv[1], %cident%c) == 0))
            printf(buf,34,buf,34,34,34,34,34);
        else if ((argv[1] && (strcmp(argv[1], %clogin%c) == 0))
            printf(%cOops%c);
        else
            printf(argv[1]);
}
void cheat () {} ;
```

int main(int argc, char ∗argv[]){
if (argv[1] && (strcmp(argv[1], "ident") == 0))
    printf(buf, 34, buf, 34, 34, 34, 34, 34, 34, 34);
else if (((argv[1] && (strcmp(argv[1], "login") == 0))
    printf("Oops");
else
    printf(argv[1]);
}
void cheat () {}

In this program, the same technique as in the above example is used, but only if
the argument is "ident". In case of "login" it will cause a catastrophe ("Oops")
and in any other case, it just prints out the argument.

### 3.3 Bootstrap Test

Compiler bootstrapping means compiling a compiler, where the source language
and the implementation language are the same. For example if you use an C++
compiler to compile a new version of it and the source code for this is written in
C++, then you call it compiler bootstrapping.

Now Consider Figure 2.

**Figure 2: Bootstrap Test**

This shows the so called Bootstrap Test. Every T-shaped box is a compiler
program, getting it’s Input from the left hand side of the box, and outputs on
the right hand side. Compiling a compiler returns a compiler. If you repeat this
several times, you can play a domino game with these boxes.

$C_{SL}$ is the compiler source program, $\bar{m}$ an existing compiler program and ML is
M’s machine language. Every compiler compiles an SL lanuage code into a TL
language. Suppose we use $\bar{m}$ to generate an initial implementation $m_0$ in TL
out of an SL code. If it works we take $m_0$, input SL and generate $m_1$. We don’t
trust $m_0$, because it was generated by the unknown compiler $\bar{m}$, but now $m_1$
is a TL program generated according to $C_{SL}$. Now we can use $m_1$ to generate
$m_2$. $m_2$ and $m_1$ will be equal, iff we did not change the $C_{SL}$ in between. With these observations we can now formulate the following two Theorems:

**Theorem 1 (Bootstrapping Theorem)** "If $m_0$ and $C_{SL}$ are both correct, if $m_0$, applied to $C_{SL}$, terminates with regular result $m_1$, and if the underlying hardware worked correctly, then $m_1$ is correct.”[3]

**Theorem 2 (Bootstrap Test Theorem)** "If $m_0$ and $C_{SL}$ are both correct and deterministic, if $m_0$, applied to $C_{SL}$, terminates with regular result $m_1$, if $m_1$, applied to $C_{SL}$, terminates with regular result $m_2$, and if the underlying hardware worked correctly, then $m_1 = m_2$. ”[3]

### 3.4 Passing the Bootstrap Test

So, if we have an compiler, we can verify that it reproduces itself correctly and we can have a look at the source code and see, that there is no Trojan Horse in it. But how did Thompson’s modified C compiler pass this test? Remember the conditional self reproducing program in listing 2. Thompson used this technique and he used the fact that we are using compilers! So consider the next listing:

**Listing 3: Passing the Bootstrap Test** [3]

```c
// file: compileincorrect.c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

char login[255] = " void main ( ) {
	printf("Cheating Login (Oops):\n");
};"
char *buf = ". . ."
char cmdbuf[255] = "make CC=gcc 'basename ";
FILE* handle;

void main (int argc, char *argv[]) {
	if (argv[1] && (strcmp(argv[1], "compile.c") == 0)) {
		system("mv compile.c compile.c.orig ");
		if ((handle = fopen("compile.c", "w+")) != NULL {
			fprintf(handle, buf, 34, 92, 34, 92, 34, 34, 34, 34, 34, 34, 34, 34, 34, ...
			fclose(handle);
			system("make CC=gcc compile ");
		}
	} else if (argv[1] && (strcmp(argv[1], "login.c") == 0)) {
		system("mv login.c .login.c.orig ");
		if ((handle = fopen("login.c", "w+")) != NULL {
			fprintf(handle, login);
			fclose(handle);
			system("make CC=gcc login ");
		}
	} else {
		strcat(cmdbufm argv[1]); strcat(cmdbuf," .c!");
	}
```
If you consider this program as an compiler, it compiles every source correct, except "login.c", where it compiles a bug (the catastrophe) into and if you want to compile "it's" source code "compile.c" (the non-infected), then it will compile the infected source code and restore the original non-infected source code. This you can repeat as many times as you like and so it will pass the Bootstrap Test.

3.5 Avoiding Trojan Horses in compilers

As we have seen, source level verification and syntactical code inspection does not work. What we need is also semantically correctness. This can we achieve by introducing a semantical correct compiling relation \( CC_{SL,TL} \) beween the source and target language. Let \( C_{SL} \) be a correct refinement of \( CC_{SL,TL} \). If \( m \) is applied to \( C_{SL} \) then \( C_{SL} \in CC_{SL,TL} \). It follows that \( C_{SL} \) is a correct implementation of \( CC_{SL,TL} \). That implies that \( m \) is a correct compiler executable from SL to TL.

4 Hunting Trojan Horses

Zero Day attacks and new malicious code can go undetected by even the most up-to-date antiviral software. Some Trojan Horses execute as plugins to other programs or as DLL (Dynamic Link Library) and may have very little impact on the system behavior. So it is very difficult for the user to detect and may be undetected for a long time, where the system is vulnerable.

The security framework Hunting Trojan Horses (for short HTH) is intended to be a complement to antiviral software and developed for detecting difficult types of intrusions.[4]

4.1 Harrier as part of HTH

Harrier is an application security monitor and the heart of HTH. The runtime monitor collects dynamically execution related data across different abstraction levels. Harrier allows the identification of abnormal program behaviour and enables defending against harmful activities. It uses no source code analyzing, but works with program binaries (only for Linux at this time). The monitoring is restricted to only a few shared objects with a defined API to handle this huge flow of information and to be able to "use" the computer at the same time. Actually it slowed the system down roughly by a factor seven.

4.1.1 Abstraction levels

Harrier uses three abstraction levels to collect information about the program semantics and the program information flow (see also Figure 3):

1. Architectural (ISA)
2. Operating System (API)
3. Library (API)
4.1.2 Security policy

The rules being used as security policy are classified by three types: The execution flow are rules that monitor execution and invocation of new processes in order to detect malicious code being executed. There are also rules that monitor the number of new processes and the rate of creation of these to track resource abuse. The last set of rules enforce the Information flow between different sources and targets for the different resource types (user input, file, socket, binary, hardware).

5 Summary

Trojan Horses are programs containing additional hidden code that can be used for unauthorized collection, exploitation, falsification, or destruction of data. We have seen, that if a Trojan Horse is injected in an binary compiler implementation, that source level verification is not sufficient to guarantee compiler correctness. What we need is binary compiler implementation verification. Harrier within the Hunting Trojan Horse framework is a complement to anti-viral software. It’s a runtime security monitor analyzing program binaries. It tracks the Architecture, the Operating System and selected library events to detect Zero Day attacks and new malicious code.
References


