

# The electronic health card, summer 2008

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## 5. Exercise sheet

Hand in solutions until Monday, 26 May 2008.

**Exercise 5.1** (ElGamal Encryption).

(7 points)

Let  $p$  be a prime number. We implement the ElGamal encryption scheme using the group  $G = \mathbb{Z}_p^\times$ . A is mapped to 0, B to 1 and so forth, Z is mapped to 25. We combine groups of three letters  $(a_0, a_1, a_2)$  to  $a_0 + 26a_1 + 26^2a_2$ . Thus ABC corresponds to the value  $0 + 26 \cdot 1 + 2 \cdot 26^2 = 1378$ .

- (i) For  $a \in G$  holds:  $a$  is an element of order  $d$  in  $G$  if and only if  $a^d = 1$  and  $a^{d/t} \neq 1$  for all divisors  $t > 1$  of  $d$ . □ 2

Furthermore: An element  $a \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\times$  is an element of order  $d$  in  $G$  if and only if  $a^{d/t} \neq 1 \pmod{p}$  holds for all *prime* divisors  $t$  of  $d$ .

- (ii) Using this show that 23 has order 24391 in  $\mathbb{Z}_{146347}^\times$ . Note that  $146347 = 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 24391$ . □ 1

- (iii) Encrypt the word "SYSTEM" using the ElGamal scheme. Use the group  $G = \mathbb{Z}_{146347}^\times$  and the element  $g = 23$ . The receiver of the message has published the public key  $a \leftarrow g^\alpha = 76441$ . Choose your public key to be  $b \leftarrow g^\beta$  with  $b = 99970$ . □ 2

- (iv) The following transcript of a conversation was intercepted, which contains a message encrypted with the ElGamal system (using the mapping from letters to numbers described above). Once more we have  $G = \mathbb{Z}_{146347}^\times$  and  $g = 23$ : □ 2

ALICE has the public key 94645.

BOB to ALICE: message (part 1) (19053, 39572).

BOB to ALICE: message (part 2) (19053, 37442).

BOB to ALICE: message (part 3) (19053, 1752).

An indiscretion revealed that one part of the message corresponds to the clear text (value) 8324. Compute the (alphabetic) clear text of the entire message.

**Exercise 5.2** (RSA signatures).

(15+2 points)

Compute an RSA signature!

- 1 (i) Generate random RSA keys with  $N$  about 30 Bits. Keep the private key  $(N, d)$  secret and tell only the public key.
- 2 (ii) You are given a document, say  $x$  is your student identification number. Compute  $y \leftarrow x^d$  in  $\mathbb{Z}_N$ .
- 2 (iii) Verify that  $y = x^d$  without using the secret key. [So you may only use the public key here!]
- 4 (iv) Give a definition explaining when  $y$  is a signature of  $x$ .
- 2 (v) Explain how a signature on  $xr^e$  can be used to get a signature on  $x$ .
- 4 (vi) Use the previous to decide whether the scheme is good (secure) or not. Prove it!
- +2 (vii) Explain why using the same RSA key for encryption and signing is a very bad idea in practice.

**Exercise 5.3** (RSA-signatures and hash functions).

(6 points)

- 6 Consider the RSA signature scheme with a hash function  $h$ . Assume that the attacker can find a second preimage of  $h$ , ie. given one document  $x$  he can find a second document  $y \neq x$  with  $h(x) = h(y)$ . Prove that the attacker can then break the scheme. Conclude a theorem: "If  $\text{RSAsign}(h)$  is secure then  $h \dots$ ".

**Exercise 5.4** (Diffie-Hellman versus ElGamal).

(2 points)

- 2 Prove that being able to distinguish two plaintexts by an ElGamal encryption (of one of two chosen plaintexts) implies breaking the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem in  $G$ . [We play the following game: We are given  $(g, b, c, d) = (g, g^\beta, g^\gamma, g^\delta)$ . Then we give a public key  $a$  to the attacker who will return two plaintexts  $x_0, x_1$ . We encrypt one of these and send its encryption  $(t, y)$  to the attacker. The attacker then returns which  $x_i$  we sent him (with high probability). Show that you can use this to check whether  $\delta = \beta\gamma$ .]