Security on the Internet, winter 2008
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3. Exercise sheet
Hand in solutions until
Monday, 17 November 2008, noon: 12:00 (deadline!).

Any claim needs a proof or an argument.

Exercise 3.1 (More on the Extended Euclidean Algorithm). (14 points)

Integers: We can add, subtract and multiply them. And there is a division with remainder: Given any $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}$ with $b \neq 0$ there is a quotient $q \in \mathbb{Z}$ and a remainder $r \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $a = q \cdot b + r$ and $0 \leq r < |b|$. (We write $a \text{ quo } b := q$, $a \text{ rem } b := r \in \mathbb{Z}$. If we want to calculate with the remainder in its natural domain we write $a \mod b := r \in \mathbb{Z}_b$.) Using that we give an answer to the problem to find $s, t \in \mathbb{Z}$ with $sa + tb = 1$. Allowed answers are: "There is no solution." or "A solution is $s = ...$ and $t = ..." Any answer needs a proof (or at least a good argument).

We start with one example: Consider $a = 35 \in \mathbb{Z}$ and $b = 22 \in \mathbb{Z}$. Our aim is to find $s, t \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $sa + tb$ is positive and as small as possible. By taking $s_0 = 1$ and $t_0 = 0$ we get $s_0a + t_0b = a$ (identity$_0$) and by taking $s_1 = 0$ and $t_1 = 1$ we get $s_1a + t_1b = b$ (identity$_1$). Given that we can combine the two identities with a smaller outcome if we use $a = q_1b + r_2$ with $r$ smaller than $b$ (in a suitable sense); namely we form $1$(identity$_0$) $- q_1$(identity$_1$) and obtain

$$(s_0 - q_1s_1)a + (t_0 - q_1t_1)b = a - q_1b.$$  

We arrange this in a table and continue with identity$_1$ and the newly found identity$_2$ until we obtain 0. This might be one step more than you think necessary, but the last identity is very easy to check and so gives us a cross-check of the entire calculation. For the example we obtain:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>i</th>
<th>$r_i$</th>
<th>$q_i$</th>
<th>$s_i$</th>
<th>$t_i$</th>
<th>comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>$a = 35$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$1a + 0b = 35$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>$b = 22$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$0a + 1b = 22, 35 = 1 \cdot 22 + 13$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$1a - 1b = 13, 22 = 1 \cdot 13 + 9$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$-1$</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$-1a + 2b = 9, 13 = 1 \cdot 9 + 4$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$-3$</td>
<td>$2a - 3b = 4, 9 = 2 \cdot 4 + 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$4$</td>
<td>$-5$</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>$-5a + 8b = 1, 4 = 4 \cdot 1 + 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>$-35$</td>
<td>$22a - 35b = 0$, DONE, check ok!</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We read off (marked in blue) that $1 = -5a + 8b$ and the greatest common divisor of $a$ and $b$ is 1. This implies that $8 \cdot 22 = 1$ in $\mathbb{Z}_{35}$, in other words: the multiplicative inverse of 22, often denoted $22^{-1}$ or $\frac{1}{22}$, in the ring $\mathbb{Z}_{35}$ of integers modulo 35 is 8. (Brute force is no solution! That is, guessing or trying all possibilities is not allowed here!)

(i) Find $s, t \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $s \cdot 17 + t \cdot 35 = 1$.  

(ii) Find $s, t \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $s \cdot 14 + t \cdot 35 = 1$.  

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Actually, there are other things which can be added, subtracted, multiplied, and allow a division with remainder. For example, univariate polynomials with coefficients in a field form a Euclidean ring. A concrete example is the ring \( \mathbb{F}_2[X] \) of univariate polynomials with coefficients in the two element field \( \mathbb{F}_2 \). (The elements of \( \mathbb{F}_2 \) are 0 and 1, addition and multiplication are modulo 2, so \( 1 + 1 = 0 \). The expression \( 1 + X + X^3 + X^4 + X^8 \) is a typical polynomial with coefficients in \( \mathbb{F}_2 \); note that the coefficients know that ’1 + 1 = 0’ where they live. Its square is \( 1 + X^2 + X^6 + X^8 + X^{16} \), any occurrence of 1 + 1 during squaring yields 0.)

(iii) Find \( s, t \in \mathbb{F}_2[X] \) such that \( s \cdot (1 + X) + t \cdot (1 + X + X^3 + X^4 + X^8) = 1 \).

To know why the EEA works prove the following statements. [Notation: We assume that the first column contains remainders \( r_i \), the second column quotients \( q_i \) and the other two coefficients \( s_i \) and \( t_i \). The top row has \( i = 0 \), and the bottom row (the first with \( r_i = 0 \) and thus the last one) is row \( \ell + 1 \). There is no \( q_0 \) and no \( q_{\ell+1} \), \( r_0 = a \), \( r_1 = b \). A division with remainder produces \( q_i, r_{i+1} \in \mathbb{Z} \) with \( r_{i-1} = q_i r_i + r_{i+1} \) with \( 0 \leq r_{i+1} < |r_i| (0 < i < \ell) \].]

(iv) For any row in the scheme we have \( r_i = s_i a + t_i b \) (0 \( \leq i \leq \ell + 1 \)).

(v) For any two neighbouring rows in the scheme we have that the greatest common divisor of \( r_i \) and \( r_{i+1} \) is the same \( (0 \leq i \leq \ell) \). [A step leading there is \( \gcd(r_i, r_{i+1}) = \gcd(r_{i-1}, r_i) \).]

(vi) The greatest common divisor of \( r_\ell \) and 0 is \( r_\ell \).

(vii) We have \( |r_{i+1}| < |r_i| \) \( (1 \leq i \leq \ell) \), so the algorithm terminates.

(viii) We have \( |r_{i+1}| < \frac{1}{2} |r_{i-1}| (2 \leq i \leq \ell) \), so the algorithm is fast, i.e. \( \ell \in \mathcal{O}(n) \) when \( a, b \) have at most \( n \) bits, i.e. \( |a|, |b| < 2^n \).

(ix) Put everything together and prove:

**Theorem.** The EEA computes given \( a, b \in \mathbb{Z} \) with at most \( n \) bits with at most \( \mathcal{O}(n^3) \) bit operations the greatest common divisor \( g \) of \( a \) and \( b \) and a representation \( g = sa + tb \) of it. In case \( g = 1 \) we thus have a solution of the equation \( 1 = sa + tb \). In case \( g > 1 \) there is no such solution.

[Hint: A single multiplication or a single division with remainder of \( n \) bit numbers needs at most \( \mathcal{O}(n^2) \) bit operations.]

**Exercise 3.2 (Polynomials over \( \mathbb{F}_2 \)).** (14 points)

Let’s consider polynomials with coefficients in the field \( \mathbb{F}_2 \). (Remember that \( \mathbb{F}_2 = \mathbb{Z}_2 \) since 2 is prime.)

(i) Take your student id, and write \( 1234567 + \) studentid = \( \sum_{0 \leq k < 24} s_k 2^k \) with
$s_k \in \{0, 1\} \subset \mathbb{Z}$. Now interpret $s_k \in \mathbb{F}_2$ and write down the polynomials

$$a = \sum_{0 \leq k < 8} s_k X^k \in \mathbb{F}_2[X],$$

$$b = \sum_{0 \leq k < 8} s_{k+8} X^k \in \mathbb{F}_2[X],$$

$$c = \sum_{0 \leq k < 8} s_{k+16} X^k \in \mathbb{F}_2[X],$$

$$d = a + b X^8 = \sum_{0 \leq k < 16} s_k X^k \in \mathbb{F}_2[X].$$

If $a = 0$, $b = 0$, or $\deg c < 3$ then add 2345678 to your real student id.

(ii) Compute $a + b$.  

(iii) Compute $a \cdot b$.  

(iv) Compute the remainder of the division of $d$ by $c$.  

Some polynomials are a proper product of others. Some are not.

(v) Prove that $X^2 + X + 1$ cannot be written as a proper product. We call such a polynomial irreducible.  

(vi) Write $X^8 + 1$ as a product of irreducible polynomials (that cannot be written as a product). [For verification only: the factors’ degrees are all 1.]  

(vii) Write $X^9 + 1$ as a product of irreducible polynomials. [For verification only: the factors’ degrees are 1, 2, and 6.]

Exercise 3.3 (AES amputated).  

As we have already seen during the lectures, AES is an extremely simple cipher, its description is very short. But still, can we make it even simpler, by hacking out superfluous bits without impacting on its strength?

Considering the four steps (SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns and AddRound-Key) performed in each round, we want to see whether those steps are essential or not to the security of the cipher.

(i) For instance, what would happen to AES should one remove the SubBytes step in each round?  

(ii) What if one were to remove the ShiftRows step?  

(iii) What about the MixColumns step?  

(iv) And the AddRoundKey step?  

(v) Conclude.