Lecture Notes

Security on the Internet

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eMail Goal : - communication, discussion - speed - send information, share it - send text messages (NOT enfire DVDs!) - make it easier, il's fashe it's cheaper -less paper - less paper - connect geographically distrubeted a parties - notification - independent of souder's & recipients location Format: net: • pure lext, electronic • formaked : [Header cblack E:e> Body Hunder bive CHL+V Osloole -> ? Foll to des the ad open > Proparties give Headers

Special header lies: 2402 29.10.08 E Fram: Esenclar> eg: From: Richael Nüskon <nvesken@bit....) To: < recipient> Subject : < subject> Date: <sending date?

More :

J inserved by mail servers Received : Reform-Path: CC: A like a C: lut must deleted løfere delivery. Bec : X-qam ... Priomidy: ... encedig info... Message - 1D: format inform (is it kek ar HTTTL as multipart...) Reply-To: con firma hou ... Before all that is one Line charling 'Frome' From u roeshen Chit. vinbounde dahe Transport of ettail ? Alice 9 sonver Score Score State

Seconty! Confidentiality Privacy Goals: " Only Bob can read the email." encomption Authenticity Bob knows that it was Alice who sand the mail. Inte mity The text was a't changed under age. Message flow confidentie hits From the existence of the message chays 'secret'. Neu - repudiation Alice cannot dency the she sent the mail. In other words, B.b can prove to charlie that the mail is from Alice (Accessibility, Reliability) Proof of submission Proof of delivery Anonymity

1 So FI 04.11.08 it feur beckmica lities : want to receive any mail (process) C · relay (or formal) anail · address info MOST be included and legible. La DNS services sapply information. about the topology of the retrock. (Seconty! 1) Lo SMTP = Send Mail Transfer Protocol spenifies details as es .: · cach mail consists of a header and a body seperated by a blank line. -> theaders are never encrypted is headers may change on the way and can blues not be signed by the sender. RELIABILITY SECURITY (safety) coulent semantics ata ches format syntax "random" atte cks (hadware fen here, natural dis esters, ...)

1/1 05.11.2008

```
Return-Path: <08ws-soti-admin@bit.uni-bonn.de>
X-Original-To: nuesken@math.upb.de
Delivered-To: nuesken@math.upb.de
[\ldots]
Received: by postfix.iai.uni-bonn.de (Postfix, from userid 13020)
        id 94C365C834; Mon, 3 Nov 2008 21:10:04 +0100 (MET)
X-Sieve: cmu-sieve 2.0
X-IAI-Env-From: <08ws-soti-admin@bit.uni-bonn.de> : [131.220.8.1]
Received: from uran.iai.uni-bonn.de (uran.iai.uni-bonn.de [131.220.8.1])
        by postfix.iai.uni-bonn.de (Postfix) with ESMTP
id 97F4F5C829; Mon, 3 Nov 2008 21:10:03 +0100 (MET)
         (envelope-from 08ws-soti-admin@bit.uni-bonn.de)
         (envelope-to VARIOUS) (2)
         (internal use: ta=0, tu=1, te=0, am=-, au=-)
Delivered-To: 08ws-soti@alias.informatik.uni-bonn.de
X-IAI-Env-From: <first.family@uni-bonn.de> : [80.136.68.129]
Received: from [192.168.178.46] (p50884481.dip.t-dialin.net [80.136.68.129])
        by postfix.iai.uni-bonn.de (Postfix) with ESMTP
         id A1CCC5C829; Mon, 3 Nov 2008 21:09:55 +0100 (MET)
         (envelope-from first.family@uni-bonn.de)
         (envelope-to VARIOUS) (2)
(internal use: ta=1, tu=1, te=1, am=P, au=first.family)
Message-ID: <490F5A8B.6000205@informatik.uni-bonn.de>
Date: Mon, 03 Nov 2008 21:09:47 +0100
From: First Family <first.family@uni-bonn.de>
Reply-To: first.family@uni-bonn.de
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.17 (Windows/20080914)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: 08ws-soti@bit.uni-bonn.de
Subject: [08ws-soti] 1234567
X-Enigmail-Version: 0.95.7
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Sender: 08ws-soti-admin@bit.uni-bonn.de
Errors-To: 08ws-soti-admin@bit.uni-bonn.de
X-BeenThere: 08ws-soti@bit.uni-bonn.de
X-Mailman-Version: 2.0.4
Precedence: bulk
[...List-Stuff...]
X-Virus-Scanned: by mailscan-system at math.uni-paderborn.de
X-Spam-Status: No, hits=0.2 tagged_above=-999.0 required=4.0 tests=AWL,
BAYES_00, DNS_FROM_SECURITYSAGE, SPF_PASS, SUBJ_HAS_UNIQ_ID,
        UNIQUE_WORDS
X-Spam-Level:
----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Charset: UTF-8
Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org
hQIOA8SRdzc1IdlqEAf/VqwMFWs1Y2rqD0AQqBjJAyVWshp6TnEFutXOEloM4q4z
CVtNAium3o2+6R3bToYgx7NIetmiQWsRm7o5QWmIeDKu6zu2ogvn275ik71vBAKk
0/M+IfUl2WSjpmYDZm62R2iAjwlQy6BbLbPeGXJ/AICm65mgajUT/mum8PA8ako6
EezCwYpbS3A0V0xHopKWDWtc9iUBaIsGR9xLozvcVyXXWMCJSV/BAHewoTFD8U57
vnMU0oSp/j8VjI+kp6koY86MJoNplcUUYG5j+IHnuJpfpIbxs2c5cNwYLKFuvZrV
RpnjoDq/61ATmssidZEw5mF4/utOG913ftKoCdXpGAf9Fzul4wPGUFOzcATLX4Ef
Q+I+x60keFC4K+mIwefsZHdhbT/XtilkeoFCtaHtvwWaqTuaSfxRnlaJshQzwHxL
[...]
aHvqZs9s5+264Q0yUqB8i7AVq6d64JL81q1h3vKEcDdFFUbS1gEYjsQ0zFI4UK0i
H+xRNHEYaC8UN1EYbulOlx1MZxz3VQ8bneX7cWmuYggkYDM0XUWfX60P3CKoCWoU
OmZbZWGzH+Il2nzeRO9/TOtHfF5enDO2yuEF3Fr6flFDjlsZIFDq4jdrZy6ucMuO
o2AR6QwuWJQ037KIiJq1ngcfA+S0+Mbdg803wuMH3ORVMNc1ejo5DYR1xw==
=S11KP
----END PGP MESSAGE-----
08ws-SotI mailing list
```

08ws-SotI@bit.uni-bonn.de

https://mailbox.iai.uni-bonn.de/mailman/listinfo.cgi/08ws-soti

Attack

>PAM

Changing / Add entra content / content

charping / Fake sender / sender charging Redirect recipiont mail

Read contract

Delectre message flow

Phisniag

send troyeans, mannis, -melvare.

Flooding / Do S

Sta Defence 04.11.08 Films, 5 Blackbisting (Signahme) Goey histing Signature (CRYPTO)

Signature ((RYPTO) t...

(Eucomp him) Eucospt (CRYPTO)

(Secure chamels, VPN, (Carhificales) EDUCATION

IDS TCP-sequere t cochies, -- signature...

Vechology

50+1 4.11.08 (3)

Eucryption -> protect against chisclosure (1) ~ NO protection against changes of routent Signature -> protect against fake sender (autorial (Z) > pookect against manipulation of could Einterrity -> protect against denials iconnection of content [authenti-cal signer) ate]

 $\overline{(3)}$

PKI

(50+I 09.11.08 (G) Encryphion caesar's cipher: SECRET -> VHFUHW Encorpt: 3° successor of each left. Decrypt: 3rd predesessor Attach: Bruke force, try all keys! Key?: 5. une out 26 possible keys. Actually: 0 ° 726 enc.: X $\longrightarrow \mathbb{Z}_{26}$ → (x+ à) rem 26. What is a letter! Remainder / well: {A, B, C, D, ... Z} en division me code them: [0, 1, 2, 25] by 26. 05.11.08/


Kerckhoffs principle: The entire encryption scheme is known to an attacher. The only thing which the attacher does not know is the key.

SofI Conclusion: 5.11.08 Since Bruke force a tack, ic. ${ \it O }$ trying all possible keys, is always possible, the unles of possible should be large. (Monadays 2° or 2'28 are considered enough.) A letter cache: Affine codes affine-enc $\mathbf{F}_{1,\mathbf{x}} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{x}} (\mathbf{\beta} \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{x})$ $\longmapsto (\beta \times + \infty) \sim 26$ # hays = 262 1. Teahure: CORRECT NESS: We can uniquely decoupt the ciphe heat. Here is particular me must have B = D We actuelly need that office-energix is invertible, ie. for every y ER26 we can solve $y = (\beta \times + \alpha)$ ver 26 ... Afficille following Schides: Solving means: $(y - \alpha) \cdot \beta^{-1} = \chi$ in $\mathbb{Z}_{26} \cdot \frac{1}{2}$ That's and possible if β is invertible. $\# \mathbb{Z}_{26}^{\times} = 12$

| So F] | os. 11.08 modulo 26 (N) hu begens 1 0, 1, 2, 3, ..., 25] Z₂₆ $a + b = \frac{1}{26} ((a + b) - m 26)$ (a +2) med 26. Division nith vemainder: Given $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}, b \neq 0$, Here exist $q, \sigma \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $a = q \cdot b + \tau$, a = 0 + r < 1 = 1 $r =: a rem b \in \mathbb{Z}$ $q =: a quo b \in \mathbb{Z}$ a mod b EEG $\frac{1}{2b}(r) = :$ a: 26 = (a: b) mod 26. PANIC+, PANC, DONT Properties : commu tative ring Not always, it so we call it a field! May be even I• {

 $Def = \left(Z_N, +, \cdot \right) as above.$ $(Z_N) = \left(Z_N, +, \cdot \right) as above.$ (3)That I wis a communative ring. Zer is a field iff Nisprime. Them Z Then 3 Give a E EN. The there exists an inverse to so that sate = 1 in En. iff a, N are coprime EEA: Iff gcd (a, N) = 1 gcd(a,N) = sarth Mag Note: Thing => Thing?. How to compute the innerse if it exists? Exuple 3 Etho, inverse? Excepte $S \in \mathbb{Z}_{20}$, where T = 5.64t.5 F =EXTENDED EUCLIDEAN ALGO. This is an example of

So we infer that 50+1 5.11.00 (4) n = -1.20 + 7.3 $i \mathbb{Z}!$ Thus 1= 7.3 i 220. 30 3 = 7 $i \mathbb{Z}_{20}$. Further statement: The EEA (i) always leminates. (ii) computes g=s·a+t·b, g, s, t E Z where g = g cd (a,b). (iii) terminates after at most Zlog2 max(a,b)+2 steps. In other words: the number of rous is at most finice the unber of bits in a ad b. $\Rightarrow O(n^3)$ r ne beblein Hun J: where n = # bits When i and b. Where is se FEN : sa = 1 in EN. ka Corollary a e >> Have is set, tet : sa + tN = 1 il **c**> g(c(a,N) = 1.the is ster i satt Nol i Z. -> Hur is a E BIV : see I in En =>. ->







One of Giovanni Battista Porta's cipher disks

Teke a permu katin 5 of Zes, Dets ic. of the lefters: Bethe cipher ? 6: Z26 -> Z26 bijective T Notices: injective = 1-1 = into surjective = outo Permutation cipher bijective = inj + surj. Replace every letter x in the plantent mith G(x) in the ciphertext. Exple X ABCDE G(x) zogra... This 5 is the key of the permutation apple. There are 26! such permutationss; so 26! possible beys. 26! 22


Let's unalige this ciphe!

14.2 CORRECT NESS: 1) 11. 11.08 Well, rice & is bijective, O we can inply use 5' on each letter of the ciphertest and get the plinkert. 2) EFICIENCY: G(n). 1 georation par letter: SEC URITY : 3) Bruke force a back? Does not work any more, 26! is too large. Frequency analysis helps! Find out the most frequent symbol in the ciphertext. Probably the encrypts the (E) which is in many luprages the most frequent like. Placeg it in and combine BROKEN



Skydale

CORRECT NESS? Yes, just need another stick of same Hickness



SECURITY ? # heys & diameter of the strick se small! -> so bruke forzing her a good chance to succeed. Beter analysis possible ...

BROKEN.

SUBSTITUTION ciplo-s

->

Coresar Affine Porme ke h'en

TRANS POSITION, ciphens

Sky hale

6+J (1.11.08 © Vijencire cipher: -> large blacks! Eucryphion : Key is a word, eg. SECRET. Then the first letter is encoypted with the Caesar cipher corresponding $f_{0} S = 17.$ ENEMY WAITING AT BERLIN. SECRETSECRETSECRETSE CORRECTNESS? V ETTICIENCY? $(\mathcal{D}(n))$. SECURITY? Brube force: 26^e, l = length of the Brube force: 26^e, l = length of the Frequency unalgers: DOESN'T WORK Possible weaknesses - layward may contain lots of Es ; eg. may have structure. - try to execute frequency analysis on every like letter. But l'is un busin. By guessing I we can read off the frequencies whether the guess was good ...

This may be som but it may work ... 5.FI (1.11.08 D KASISKI ablack. BROKEN Possible imprévenuents (1) Use a hoy as large as the plantext. (2) Choose the key at remdam uniformly, so it does not have structure. This is the one-time-pad. This cipher is correct & efficient · absolutely secure. in a mathematically strong sense.

12.11.08 One-Time Pad So FI Assume the plaintext p is a string of a bits. Now doose a key k as a random u- luit string, vin formely! Thet is : $Yk: prob (K = k) = 2^{-h}$ remedien ane ibbe variable possible autputting of a a key key Encrypt: apples lext c = P€ €. txor additi-i Zz. Decrypt: $p = c \oplus k$ c⊕k = (j@k)@k TProof: $= p \Theta \frac{2k}{0} = p \cdot \int$ Then The one-time gad is absolutely secure. prob(P=p|(=c) = prob(P=p)



SPIEGEL special 1/1996 41


Side venuchs : conditional probability $\frac{3mb(A \cap B)}{(I = 1)} = \frac{GFI}{(I = 1)}$? ~ (A | B) prob(B) probability of A under condition B A The theorem uses a random vanishe which describes the knowledge of the ablacker about the choice of the glain heat. It is independent of K. Further: C := P & K. Proof Let's compute prob(P=p | C=c) $p \rightarrow b (P = p \land P \oplus K = c)$ pmb(P@K=c)prob (P=p ~ K=c@p) pmb(PWK=c)pnb(P=p) pnb(K=cop)pub (POK = c)

50FI 12.11.08 3 By definition prot $(K = cop) = 2^{-4}$.

Furlo p = p = (P = H = c)= p = p + K = c = p= p = p + K = c = p $= \sum_{\substack{p \neq b}} p = p \cdot p \cdot p \cdot b \left(K = c \cdot p \right)$ $= 2^{-n} \cdot \frac{\sum p \cdot b(P - p)}{\sum z - 1}$ $= 2^{-n} \cdot \frac{\sum p \cdot b(P - p)}{\sum z - 1}$


Thus prob (P=p | C=c) $\frac{pwb(K = c@g)}{pwb(P@K = c)}$ R_2^{m} = prob(P=z). = qrob(P=p).

That is : He ablacker does not learn f anything from the ciphentext c.



Randomness is expensive! 12.11.08 -> rehat about revening the key? Thate is : we have Pr, Pe two plan lexts. But only une key k: $e_{x} = p_{x} \oplus k$, c2 = 72 @k The adacker can add cr ad ce: C. Q C2 = Pr @ P2. This is a out 2n like! go the attack knows half of the plain lexts. If the plaintexts have structure the verning information can be guessed. Lovenz 5242 H. Bo Hom : Two True Pad is completely insecure.

















Designed as Rijndael by JOAN DAEMEN and VINCENT RIJMEN

computer universität**bon** security Rheinische Bonn-Aachen Friedrich-Wilhelms-International Center for Universität Bonn Information Technology




$\left\lceil d_{0} \right\rceil$	$\begin{bmatrix} a_0 & a_3 & a_2 & a_1 \end{bmatrix}$	$\begin{bmatrix} b_0 \end{bmatrix}$
d_1	$a_1 a_0 a_3 a_2$	b_1
d_2	$\begin{bmatrix} a_2 & a_1 & a_0 & a_3 \end{bmatrix}$	b_2
d_3	$\begin{bmatrix} a_3 & a_2 & a_1 & a_0 \end{bmatrix}$	$\lfloor b_3 \rfloor$



Each column is considered as a polynomial and multiplied by c = 02 + $01z + 01z^2 + 03z^3$.

Inverse: Multiply with $d = 0E + 09z + 0Dz^2 + 0Bz^3$.

The AddRoundKey operation



Simple XOR with the round key.

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The field \mathbb{F}_{2^8}

 $\mathbb{F}_{2^8} \ni a = a_0 + a_1 x + a_2 x^2 + a_3 x^3 + a_4 x^4 + a_5 x^5 + a_6 x^6 + a_7 x^7,$ where $a_i \in \mathbb{F}_2 = \{0, 1\}.$

Representation: 8 bits for an element = 1 byte.

Addition: XOR, $(a+b)_i = a_i + b_i$.


Multiplication: as for polynomials modulo $x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$.

Example $57 \cdot 83 = C1$:

$$\begin{aligned} (x^6 + x^4 + x^2 + 1) \cdot (x^7 + x + 1) &= x^{13} + x^{11} + x^9 + x^8 + x^7 + \\ & x^7 + x^5 + x^3 + x^2 + x + \\ & x^6 + x^4 + x^2 + 1 \\ &= x^{13} + x^{11} + x^9 + x^8 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + 1 \\ &= x^7 + x^6 + 1 \mod x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1. \end{aligned}$$

Field: You can divide by every non-zero element.


The S-box



Highly nonlinear: $y \mapsto 05 \cdot y^{254} + 09 \cdot y^{253} + F9 \cdot y^{251} + 25 \cdot y^{247} + F4 \cdot y^{239} + 01y^{223} + B5 \cdot y^{191} + 8F \cdot y^{127} + 63.$


Simple implementation using a 256 byte lookup table.

The SubBytes operation



Apply the S-box to every byte.

The ShiftRows operation



The rows are shifted cyclically by zero, one, two, or three bytes.

Polynomials over the field \mathbb{F}_{2^8}

$$\begin{split} R &= \mathbb{F}_{2^8}[z]/(z^4+1) \ni a_0 + a_1 z + a_2 z^2 + a_3 z^3, \\ \text{where } a_i \in \mathbb{F}_{2^8}. \end{split}$$


Addition: coefficient-wise $(a + b)_i = a_i + b_i$, XOR.

Multiplication: as for polynomials modulo z^4+1 . Another way to express $d = a \cdot b$ is by the following matrix equation:

$$\begin{bmatrix} d_0 \\ d_1 \\ d_2 \\ d_3 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} a_0 & a_3 & a_2 & a_1 \\ a_1 & a_0 & a_3 & a_2 \\ a_2 & a_1 & a_0 & a_3 \\ a_3 & a_2 & a_1 & a_0 \end{bmatrix} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} b_0 \\ b_1 \\ b_2 \\ b_3 \end{bmatrix}$$

Not a field: $(z + 1)^4 = 0$.


The MixColumns operation




Each column is considered as a polynomial and multiplied by $c = 02 + 01z + 01z^2 + 03z^3$.

Inverse: Multiply with $d = 0E + 09z + 0Dz^2 + 0Bz^3$.

The AddRoundKey operation



Simple XOR with the round key.



12,11.08 We have seen . transposition cipturs substitution ciptors -> mechanical & electrical dévices for ciphers AES computé proprens, t various attacks. But all this just is in the situation Eve of Alice symmetric eucryption

What if there is no safe way to send the secret bey? 1.11.08 20tI 0

Alice Ephone call > Kob (@ Born) (@ Sidney) (@ Born) (@ Sidney) (Eve is historing. Can that work? British Secret Service "Non-secret encomption" Auswers: 197-1-74 Diffie & Hellin an Jobbic RSA Crypto 1976 1978 We need a group, Ésay commutative! For excepte: ZN, ar Z, or (Hq^{2×2})[×] = GL₂(Hq) non-commukehing F, ~ ₹[×], ~ finte (comm.) provos

Al these are det

18.11.08 o.o. class Remember : group = of elements with 1 bluery op. (2) **I**ffI & PAN((C). So what? multiplication. we an use repeated mathiptication ... 2 g E G volere 6 is our group. So: given re N. and compole grin 6. We can greek like nce r Alice XEN b = g^B [Diffie Hellman k₂ = a^B. key exchange e e a=g^k k = 6^K $k_{x} = k_{z}$ Actually : $k_{n} = b^{n} = (g^{\dagger})^{n} = g^{\dagger \cdot n}$ $k_1 = 2 = (g') = g'$ $A = V, g' = (g')^{\beta} = a^{\beta} = k_1$ Need the expense highly law

ORRECT? Yes: we define corrections [18.11.08 here to mean that $k_1 = k_2$. (3) Efficient? Yes, by square & multiply By excepte: Que giagroup G, KEN. Corpok gt. 1. Write K in brinny, sage: (dry, drz, -, do) with die []. F to be precise : $\sum_{i=0}^{r} \alpha_i 2^i = \alpha \cdot \int$ h ← g · 3. FOR i from r-2 down o do 4. $h \leftarrow h^2$. 5. $if d_i = 1$ then $h \leftarrow h \cdot g$. End FOR 6. Return h. 7. Theorem square & multiply (i) does compute g. (ii) needs almost - 1 squarings and at most - ~ multiplications. Fact It can be proved that we need (in a svikable surse) at least -1 squaris.

If the group operation is efficient (B.11.08) (as e.g. in Zp* we have $G(u^2)$ bit operations when u = #bill(p)) exponentiations when u = #bill(p)) (arollary He exponentiation using sprace & multiply is efficient. So logether: Diffie & Hellman is efficient.

SECURITY What does Eve know? 6, 9, a, 5 ad the algorithm. 12 What does Eve want? $\mathbf{k} := \mathbf{k}_{\tau} - \mathbf{k}_{z} \quad .$ Diffie - Helman - problem for G THP Given g. q, b in Arafpe G. (ompuk k = g a. k when a=g x, b=g k. What help would be use ful? Will, give a such that a = g^K.

Discrete Logarithen problem for G SofI 18.11.08 DEP binn g, a in G. DEP Compute & such that a=g^K Compute & such that a = g^K & or report that no & exists. Assume Eve can solve the DLP. Then Eve can solve the DHP: Algenth inget : g. q.b. output : R 1. Call the DLP arache to fid x with a = g^d. 2. Compute the bx. Return k. 3. This If the Diffie Wellman hey exchange is secare then the DLP in the used group 6 must be difficult. we just did thet! Proof : П

an at least: from far can neget? Breaky the DLP ... give g, a in a group 6, Task: fid a mach that a = got (or tell that there is none.) we assume that gia, and a each fit ito a bits. Trivial solution : 6[2]) . Try out all K. . Try a roundan & ad check whether it works. Repeat until successful. (2") Interludia : Repeat somethid Until condition where the condition holds with probability 7 each time the the expected runtime is: The lave to sum one the probabilities to exit after & rands: $\sum (1-p)^{k-1} p \cdot k$. The rest is an algoris ... J

Toy to write $x = \alpha_1 \cdot q + \alpha_0$ (Soft with $q = 2^{L^{u/2}}$. Setter? Now: there are it hits in to and it hits in to Baby shep - Giant skep - algorithe Inprt: g,a. A. Determine $q \approx O(2^{u/e})$. Problem: j^2 . Compute a table of jtable, j^2 . j^2 table, j^2 . j^2 table, j^2 Output: X. 0 (2"/e) $c = a \left(g^{-q}\right)^{\alpha_{q}}$ $f_{w} = 0, ..., 2q$ mtil c=gde for some do. (tuble look up !) $u_{k} \parallel N_{ow}: a (q^{-q})^{k_{q}} = g^{k_{q}}$ $q \in \mathcal{J}$ ie 4. Return 21.94x0.

50+3 Birth day paradox The expected muches of people (3) to mike until a birth day collision occurs is O(V#birthdays). Pollard - S "Guers " tuple t= (r.S. agr, g8) mtil a collision occurs of the for : $ag^{8} = g^{5}$ Run Line: expected O(V2")=O(2") Memory: $shill O^{(2''e)}$ To improve this we make the choice of Juples less runda: Choose the first tapk. to. Fix ou function mapping heptes to heptes, t; = f(t;-1). And consider the sequence (+;). Now: implement Flayd's trick:

Consider to sequences: $t_i = f(t_{i-i}).$ (1) to, t, t2, ..., $s_i = f(f(s_{i-1})).$ (2) S=to, Sr, Sr, Sr, ... set of all I dea : tuples FINITE!]-{ (⊙ -}, Non only compare S: to ti. $s_{i} = f^{(2i)}(s_{i}),$ Note that $t_i = f^{(i)}(t_a)$ $s_{i} = f^{(i)}(t_{i}).$ 30 How if there is a collision then it must occur between s; and t: for some index. So we only need to show 2 elements.

504I 13.11.08 Runtine? No jolea. Expected runtine? No idea. Houristic expected mutine: O(24) Advantage: very small Storage requirements. Even belev? Due can prove a lower No : board that within a group G with #6 elents every rundanized algorithm needs \$\$ SZ (V#6') operations in 6 on average... if you do not use anything about the special structure of your provp. For excuple: in Eg there is an algorithm using at a log n' skeps. It's shill not polythme. 2

SAT So Zz is not that mice i 15.1.08 There is a particularly well-suited 6) family of groups where no atacks essentially below them Babysky - Giatskep on Pollard-g are known. Inherluction: Elligtic curves Consider a equation of the form $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ in two un knowns x, y. If we work over R:

10 Sofs 19.11.08 Addition? $y^2 = x^3 x$ -R. Define addition soch that Lie x= 5,+ 5,·2 P+Q+R=0So defin P+Q := -R.y = 7. + 74 · 1 y² = x³ − X gives a cubic equation Wat R+ (-R) =+ () for 7. ie R + (-R) + (-G) = 0Where is the time Huraugh $R_1 - R_1 = d\theta = -\theta$? We expect: -0=0. ... So $1f R = (x_3, y_3)$ $l_{k_{1}} - R = (x_{3}, -y_{3}).$ Replace R lug a finite field! Then the curve is finite and that's what to use.

SofI Recall 25.11.08 Diffie - Hellman 7.5 (ge6) Alice h er Z x ER Z e b b=gf $a = g^{K}$ Ľ $\Rightarrow k_2 = a^{\beta}$ k, = b Note: a, b, k, k, are i G au must be calculated using the operation (s) i 6! Fringh G= Zp , p prime g = ? obviers: g=t is bad! Well, what is good? the under of possible Necessory : autcomes for gowers of 3 unest be lærge! (Tokat's the number of keys!) * { g · | i ∈ Z } < g> _____ ord g := Define : the subgroup of 6 generalial by g Order of q

50+J 25.11.08 ord g = mitte { i e Nol g'= 1 }. Them (when mil = 00 = # 7) why should g'= 1 be ever fulfilled Observation : for is 0 ? Say, if the group is fink. Consider the picture: ge is in the second sec Lice 6 is puike, we much have q' = g j for some i,j, rag i>j. (Pidgeon hale principle) The : g = g = -1because 6 is a group and Hues we can divide by g¹. Now in the this we have, assuring g'= 1, iso: $\langle g \rangle = d -1, g, g^2, \dots, g^{n-1}$

Sotī 8.11.08 (3) Assume na mi ligi=1 3. Proof (Thim) Then g = 1. And Hus $g^{*}g^{*}$ $\langle g \rangle = q^{*} - q^{*}, g^{*}, g^{*}, \dots, g^{*-1} \}.$ × Don'ourly : E: Take gi, jed. With je gingt anth 0 = + < n. The go's guts $= (g'')^{q} g' = g'$ E ths. ord g = n = min (iso 1 g'= 1]. Thus (ousides again (*). Assume that #<g> <n. then for some 0: it is an are have g' = g'Say is j. the $g^{i-j} = 1$. But O<i-j <n contractiching $n = min \{ i \in M_{>0} \mid g' = 1 \}.$ Go our assumption is false, ad #<g>≥ n. M

So back to choosing g & Zz ... SetI 25.11.08 Aim: Make the DLP difficult! $p = 2^3 + 1 = 41$ Except as a candidate of a price where p.r is a product of many small primes. Take g=2. Zy, -d 0, 1, 2, ..., 20, -20, -15, ..., -1 -20, -15, ---, -1 3. i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 5 10 gi 1 2 4 8 16 -9 -18 5 10 20 -1 $\frac{1}{3} = \frac{10}{1} - 2 - 4 - 8 - 16 - 3 - 18 - 5 - 10 - 20 - 1 = \frac{10}{3} - \frac{1}{3} - \frac{1}{3}$ Thues : and g = 20 = 2.5. let's try to fid & mil that 2=5. Bruke force: Hime $G(\#6) = O(2^{"})$ where n = size of storage for an element of 6. Bruke force is no solution!) (Rementer:

5.11 28.11.01 S We can simplify the lask: 2=5, well, we have 20 choices for κ bee. Exponetiale: $(2)^{\kappa} = 5^{\tau}$ for some nice r. for some nice τ . For example with $\tau = 10$ are get: $(-1)^{\alpha} = -1$ $(-1)^{\alpha} = -1$ $(-1)^{\alpha} = -1$ $(-1)^{\alpha} = -1$ $(-1)^{\alpha} = -1$ α must be odd! $(-1)^2 = -1$ Thus : Driving this to the spinit -> Pohigettellman. It will turn out that is order to solve the DLP for the alem 12 of order 20 = 2.5° it is mough to solve ane DLP for an element of oroles 5, Ano DLPs da a demit of rock 2.

So: A further condition on g, teamely: **Ito**2 25.11.09 the order of g must not be a product of small primes Buch to our the group cloice for Diffie & Holling: Choose Zox ad gE Ept such that q:= and g is a lerge prime. choose p prime, sufficiently large. I dea Os (say tozy bits). . Pick fr Ep Zz . . Determine ord (h) _ Difficult. ... and hape that it is a large prime. : Choose q prime, cofficie dy large (say 200 bit). Solution . Choose p price, so that Z_p^{k} has elements of orolar q. . Prok $h \in_{\mathbb{R}} Z_q^{k}$ and led $g \leftarrow h^{\frac{p-1}{q}}$.

We already know that give g E G, G finite proup, 5075 25.11.08 for some :> 0 rove fiel g'=1. Question: Which orders can occur? Back to our excepte: Ryy. <u>g 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</u> ordg 1 20 40 10 20 20 4 5 Nole: # 241 = 40. All orders - so far - divide 40. Theorem (Little Fermer Flear) Theorem (Little Fermer Flear) I Give $a \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{\times}$, p prime. I Give $a \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{\times}$, p prime. Then $a \stackrel{p=1}{=} 1$.

Theorem (Lagrange) Vien & a fimile group, and a EG. Then #6 = 1.

80.11.25 Skeld: List all group elemts Jen Je, ge, ----, ge-1 with y = #6. (all dron-equal and the list is complete.) Multiply mill a: ago, aga, aga, ---, a 98-1 Multiply each list: 6 comme tative ago · agi -- · agi-1 Jo'Ir'--- J8-1 50

V. Do prof Legrange derive corollaries updale DH. and (gk) = ? Pohliz - Helmann egain CRT

Proof Assume additionally: 6 commetative, Consider a list of all group elements: Soft \$.11.08 (\mathbf{J}) Jo, Ja, ---, Jx-1 where y = #6. * = list means : no repetitions, no ommissions. Now, multiply by a: ago, agr, ..., agr-1. Obrious : all these are proup elements. no vepetitions, Rachine ! om 🗰 issions. no se pe hous : Assume to the contrary that ag: = ag; las some (i + j), i.j e (0,..., y-1]. Hulkiply by a' and obkin g; = g;. Since the first list has no repetitions we mush have inj. G. no omissions Take my grace elem 1, say g:. Find j mike g: = agi. To do so fid j ruch that $g_j = a^{-1}g_j$. Now: g:= ag: . . Thus the two lists are equal up to orcher.

5.11.08 2.11.08 2 Thus $\overline{IIg}_i = .71 (ag_i)$ icg ciæ 6 is comme ta tive... Now, Sivide by the las .: $1 = a \cdot \frac{\overline{TT} g_i}{\overline{TT} g_i} = a \cdot \frac{\#G}{\overline{TT} g_i}$ ס Excepte coul. $G = \mathbb{Z}_{41}^{\times}$, g = 2. $\rightarrow \text{ oul } g = 20$, # G = 40#G = 40. Lagrange hells us : g 40 g = 1. we checked: $g^{20} = 1$. $L_3 (g^{20})^2 = 1$ (orollany a finike proop 6, and a E 6. lipine Then oda | #6. Proof Assume it's woong. Noite #6 = q · orda + r, O& + corda Now: 1= a #6 = (a rola) # r - ~ r/1+corda

What happens if we apply the Theorem (Lagrand 26.11.08 to the unit group ZN of the ring of integers (3) modulo N? Theorem (Euler) $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{\times}$ is gcd(a, N) = 1. Given NENZ, Then $a^{\varphi(N)} = 1$ arbre $\varphi(N) := \# \overline{Z}_N^X$ this is called the Euler to tient function. I Further we can restrict N to primes: Theorem (Little Fermat Theorem) Give p prime, 0 < a < p. Then a ? - 1. in Zz. Proof well, specialize Eules to N=7 prime, or Lagrange to Z.

For Diffie & Hollman the most control [Sof building block is the exponentiation:	15 .08)
$Z \longrightarrow G$ $k \longrightarrow g^{k}$	
We know now that $g^{\#6} = 7$ and $\langle g \rangle = d \cdot 1, g, g^2, \dots, g^{\#6-1}$.	
So when computing gd	
where $\alpha = q \cdot \#6 + g \cdot 0 + g < \#6$	ر
	always the same
$\overline{\mathcal{A}} \longrightarrow G$	1 1 0 1 R
Noke: whicherer kEZ you choose mith &= & mod #6 =	He cleme

SofJ 24.11.08 Actually this map is even 5 a komemorphism: $(Z_{\#6}, +) \longrightarrow (G, \cdot)$ This property chavacteries 'hemomorphisme'. Variati consider a froup element g of order l: g = 1 The we obtain similarly : This is also a homomorphism but additionally bijective! This is what the D&H key exchange is based: . even puting expg is easy -> Guene & multiply . computing expg is some times probably difficult!

So The correct Diffie & Hellowan hey exchange Efd2 26.11.08 is this ! g E 6 an element of Large prime ovcker l Bob Alice dER He BER Ze $a = g^{\alpha} \qquad b = g^{\beta} \qquad b = g^{\beta} \qquad k_{1} = a^{\beta} \qquad k_{2} = a^{\beta} \qquad k_{3} = a^{\beta} \qquad k_{4} = a^{\beta} \qquad k_{5} =$ $b = g^{\beta}$ Eve wats to compute $k = k = k} Thiffie$ give g, a, b. ProblemShe can do so easily if she can solve the discrete logarithen problem. We would like to prove however: if Eve can solve \implies Eve can solve DLP forg. But that's unknown (if not known to be wring).

507I 26.11.08 7 Next task: Suppose meknom ord(g). lampsk and (gE). Side remark: cince it is difficult to compute orders this may be important. Excepte cont In Zyr we have and 2 = 20. And we have found that from that we can determie $\operatorname{ovel} 2^{\overline{5}} = \frac{20}{5} = 4$. $ad 2^4 = \frac{20}{4} = 5.$ 2 $ad 2^8 = 5 \neq \frac{20}{8} = 25$ But 20 gcd (8,20) Theon scd(k, ordg) Caset klandg ie. geol(k, ndg)=k Pros (ase? god (E, ordg) = T. <u>Case 3</u> general : put to getter ...

[Sof] 26.11.08 (P) lese t l:= ord g We have $g^{l} = 1$ $l = a \cdot k$. ad $\left(g^{k}\right)^{a} = 1$ Thus $\operatorname{ord}(g^k) \leq \alpha$. ad so $(g^{\epsilon})^{b} = g \stackrel{\epsilon b}{\underset{1}{\overset{1}{\overset{1}}}}$ H. Case 2 We have g'=1, Bésout equation 1 = s. k + t l for some s, t using the EEA. me have will let's try: $g = g^{1} = g^{1,k} (g^{\ell})^{t} = g^{1,k} = (g^{\ell})^{1}$ Assme that 2 Lan $\left(g^{L}\right)^{a}=1$ $\left(\frac{g^{ks}}{2}\right)^{q} = 1^{3}$ Kan a must be at least ordg. J. and gt = and g. And so

Pohlig & Hellin an agai

g i some group Gim of order e= TT p: ad a e <g>. Find x Et such that g = a Take k I C Ku (g k) = a k and this determines \propto modulo and $(g^{\epsilon}) = \frac{\ell}{k}$. Fram that we can obtain gostial answers on d. Shart with &= $\frac{e}{P}$. H $(g^{k})^{\times} \stackrel{\sim}{=} a^{k} a^{k} a^{k} a^{k}$ determines a modulo 9:. Now, write d = d, · p; + do. By this we know do. Take $k = l/p_i^2$ the $(g^{k_{f_i}})^{d_i}g^{k_{d_o}} = (g^{k_i})^{d_i}f_i + d_o = a^{k_i}$

5.4] 26.11.08 9

SofI 21.11.08 (40) Sout this : $(g^{k_{p_i}})^{\alpha_{q_i}} \stackrel{(g)}{=} a g \qquad \mathbb{R}$ ord $g = ord g = \frac{e_{P_i}}{P_i^*}$ order $g_i DLP$ = ord $g = p_i$ ad obser so we can obtai de modulo p: from (1) x = d, p; + do modulo p;. Thus we know known partially mod pi consider $k = \frac{k}{p_i^3}$ Next skp: and mike $d = d_2 p_i^2 + d_3 p_3 + d_0$ We can continue this as long as $\frac{e}{p;f} \in \mathcal{E}, ie. f \leq e:.$ $\ell = TT p_i^{e_i}$ fa takel we obtine Put this lope ther to ab this a using CRT. four each idex i.

6 is a finite group. SofI 2.12.01 Repetition: Define ordg := # dg i liEZ } Order of xg>
 isubgroup
 generated
 Them k_{ey} joit: $\langle g \rangle = \langle 1, g, g^2, ..., g^{and}g - 1 \}$ Then ord g | #G. Them (Lagrange) g = 7 for any g & 6. tille tomat The (tales) G= ZN semit group of integers molelon: To Oca < N, gcc((a, N) we have $a \notin (N) = 1$ in Z_N^X where $\varphi(N) := \# \mathbb{Z}_N^{\times}$. Thu (Little Tennet) G = Zz, pprime: The pipie, de e ep we have p-t = 1 i Zp^x la alle vards: Constant Tax a E Rp me have a Paa = 0. (pprine)


-Hollman Di ffic Fix a poor 6 Sehre ad an element g ne oak such that and g **<**g>. is a large prime Bob Alice BEZ, de Z 6 = g B $u = g^{K}$ 5 $b_{2} = a^{\beta}$ $k_{i} = b^{\alpha}$ Now to doose badg? Flind discrete logarithe attacks : O(Vg) · BabyShep-GicalShep · O(V#G>) O(Vg) · BabyShep-GicalShep · O(V#G>) O(Vg) · Pollarol-S · have: exp. O(V#G\$) -7 O(Vlaget). Pohlig Hellenen O(Vlergestprie factor) of ord g · Index calculus for Ep E(2 V Ry p. log lagp') Note: nothing like inder calculus known for elliptic cours.

Sof [2.12.08 Now large should thips be? g should be prime (1) to prevent Pohlig-Hellman foan making discrete leg easier g should be so large that (2) D(Vy) is begand scope (of an a bador ... Of course the constant is important the. In prachice: $9 \stackrel{\sim}{>} 2 \stackrel{160}{(2^{\circ})}$ If G= Z[×]₂ the 3 should be so large that index calculus becomes in feasible: $O(2^{Vegploylog})$ (3) In practice: $p \approx 2^{1024}(2^{2018})$


Remaining bask: Excepte Yay we are looking for XEN: uch that X = 1 = 2 = Z, ® $\chi = 1$: Z, 3 $\kappa \doteq \mathcal{Z}$ i Zz. () x = 3 What's 2? a = 3, 8, 13, 18, 23, 28, ... Here we an quess: () ?? x = 🔣 23, (2 -> ×, Thus & = 23 Bruk furce run kine: O(2) where u = bitleyth (2.3.5). $0_{\rm F}$ $\alpha = 53$. = Z, because 30 = 0 - Z3 30 = 0~ Z' 30 = 0 big 30 = 2.3.5.

S. +I 2. 12.08 (5) Bele solution ? Yet's only considerand &, E: d = 2 i Z3, $\alpha = 3 = 25.$ Retranslake these: for some sER, $\alpha = 2 + s \cdot 3_{\pm}$ for some tet. $\alpha = 3 + (-t) \cdot 5.$ $2 + s \cdot 3 = 3 + (-t) \cdot 5$ Thus : 5.3 + t.5 = 3-2. er : This can be done by the extended Eidlidean algorithm. <u>Chinese Remainder Theorem</u> <u>Down To Earth vanim 1:</u> <u>Given moduli ma, ma, ma</u> pairmise coprime, and numbers and az , -- ar EZ Then there exists a number of EZ such that fi: $\alpha = \alpha_i$ in \mathbb{Z}_{m_i} and a is unique modulo maine in. Further, one such solution can be found in polynomial time (wort the bitlength (m, m, a, m, a)) with help of tay the EEA.

SofI Structural variant 2.12.08 Give meduli ma, ..., ma ENZZ 6 peirmise coprime, m := TT m; 15:55 Then the map Zm ~ Zm x Zm x ... x Zm & moder > (a moder, a moder, ---, a moder,) is a weldere, bije chive homomorphism vigenter (migueness) sur jective (= existence)




Proof CRT is case r=2.	Sofl
	2.12.08 (7)
That's enough:	
$Z_m \longrightarrow Z_{m_q} $	(Z m2 · m5
m	
	$\cong \mathbb{Z}_{m_2} \times \mathbb{Z}_{m_3 \cdots m_r}$
	â
Now, we are booking for all Z. such that d= a, in Z.	me ⁴ . m5
such that	
· · · · · ·	
$d = a_2 = Z$	May .
	(10)
Ituauffices la consider az = 1	$, q_2 = 0 \rightarrow \alpha^{(0)}$
$\alpha_{1} = 0,$	$q_2 = 1 \rightarrow K$
(10)	(01)
Give d'enth (10) = 1 i Kma, K ⁽¹⁰⁾ = 0 i Kma, We can construct (10)	& = 0 - Zmy
$\mathcal{K} = 0 = \mathcal{I}_{m_2}$	K = T jin Zmz.
we can construct	
(10)	(01)
$\chi = a_{1} \cdot \chi +$	az X,
Marely, now: $d = a_1 \cdot 1 + a_2 \cdot 0$	= ar in Zmr,
$\alpha = \alpha_1 \cdot 0 + \alpha_2 \cdot 1$	= az i Zuz.
Go let's fiel 2 (10).	



Estampte. 24I Nomles theory 6 finike group a #6 = 1 Lagrage / Eacher / Fermat $a^{\varphi(N)} = \tau \doteq \overline{Z}_N^{\chi}$ at it is the Orders ord (g) CRT gelfin)=1=> Zmin = Zm × Zn Alfonthins Square & multiply EEA Baby-sky-simt-sky, Pollard-g, Pohlig-Hellinam Carpo Diffie - Hellman key exchange DHP : (g,g^{*},g^B) > g^{*B} $DLP : (g, g^{\prime}) \longrightarrow \alpha$ GORRECT? EFICIENT? Would wat something like: SECURE? HORE if DLP is deflicell the DHD is difficult Easy: if DLP is easy the DHP is easy. Thus for security it is necessary that DLP is difficult. But it is not known to be sufficient.

Ito2 9E6 9.12.08 Rob Alice 2 (005) (Bond) 3 F (^x)^β (g^β)* AESR k=f(g*) $h = f(g^{A})$



would solve that Synatures problem!

1+02 What does a physical signature? 9.17.08 Document unchanged. (Inhegrity) $\overline{}$ Person who signed is Alab (Authen ticity, Iclentification) Courrection doccossipre. Notes Q Easy to verify 1306 Hard to generate for others Easy to generate for the signer. El Gamal type signatures Setup: tobe défiel laber. beneration: la be defid laber. some easy Verification: [ab* b = g hech(m) in G 11 finike element of 6 guong clone k of 6, with difficult bosh powers of g. DLP, ray fi= ord(g) *: 6 -> Ze in simple - minded way. Hore :

consequently we construct: Sot_ Choose a prove G Setup: and an element of of known (prime) or cher l The example: choose la 160-bit mie. choose p a 1024-bit prie with ll g-1. (chance a such that 1+ a.l has 1024 bits check whether it's prime, if not retry!) cheose h E Z, at rende ad set $g := h^{\frac{p+7}{2}}$ (The g = 1, If g=1 : retry.) Now ordy = C. Fix a function *: G -> Ze simple minded. For example with 6=<g> < Z, use (a mod p)* = a mod p-1 for Oxaxp. Fix a function hash: 10, 13* -> Zp.

Individual setup (by Alice)! SofI 9.12.08 **5** benerale a signature : Inpol: message m, public key a, privale key Output: signature s= (b, g) on m. to archer to have the entire signing equation as powers of g, choose b as one: 1. Choose a konporcey secret & EREe ad compute b = gt in 6. Determin & e Ze such that signature is valid, ie 7. $ab^{*} + \beta = ghesh(m) in G$ which is equilant (by exps: He -> 2g> being bijective) $ab^{*} + \beta y = hash(m) i \mathbb{Z}_{e}$ This is a licar equation for g. Solve it and 3. Return (b, 8)

Soft CORRECT ? If Alice signs in with (6.8) 5.12.08 0 the Bol checks this signature al finds it to be valid. This is true by construction! EHICIENT? Ever Schop: Glut) ~ minutes Individual setup ? Generation ? $O(n^3)$ r seconds Verification ? u= hey cite. 10.12.08 SEC URITY! Security game: Attacker tries to a black. We try to avoid his success. Setup/ grove, receaser, its ach.) EF_CMA public kouss of many por hicipunts Skuint oveck Ming: Attacher time himit eille: 1 year chosen by a blackes sign(m;) os: goly-thme to the oracle > (m, s), a; verily(m,S) We say that the attaches & success ful iff in was nover as keel TRUE.

So FT 10.17.08 (1) Security goal is : No ablacker can succeed with high probability. (2th is ok, but <u>I</u> is too much!) (ousequences: 1 No attacker can change a given de comment. Accounty he could the using that so brow time chaugedec he would min the forme. change dec (m, s) = (m', s')Lathere if (m, s) is valid. He (m', s') is valid. No attacker can change the signer. Assuming he could; ic. he has a sabrautive champesigner (m, s, a) (w', s', a') the he would un the game.

(2)

No one but the actual SofI 3 10.12.08 cæn have genera hed a certein signature. Ø Totherwise that would be a successful abacks. J What a boat El Gamal type signatures? The DLP must le difficult Thm if the Eifloamel type signature scheme is secare. DLP easy => Elbanaltype signahue insecure Proof Assume the attacker has a subroa him to solve the DLP. Then he can use it to compute the secret keys corresponding to the public keys aj. Thus he wins the same easily. ヮ Actually, then the attacker can sign any mensage he is given.

SofI Another aption for the attacks would 10.12.08 be to try to fid b last and 3 choose mig at randa before. Then he to solve an equation $a^{b^{r}}b^{r}=h$. If he would he le could in the game We would like to prove: com solve if he chuld then he the DLP. But: Them If the Elband type signature is second I then theet proble is difficult. ŋ Further building block: hash. Assum the attacker has a cobrective that can, given a suessage m, find a se cond message m' = m with hash (m') = hash (m) the the abade can min the game.


uot <u>second</u> preimege resistent, (1) ic. the attacker has such a subroutive, Them If the hask function is Hum the scheme is insecure. 100 / Choose in 63 50,13 Call submetime to fid m' for mill, nash (m')=hash (m) Ask the oracle for a signature s on m. N If the hash function is Them not collision resistant, ie. The dather des no subranhime that autputs two messages m, m' such that in \$ m' and hask(m) = hask(m'). then the scheme is in secure. As above Proc Ŋ Hole: Trydrig in given in entre hash(in') shashlind can be

Excepte Oue commen hask fuction is SHA1 il gets any message as a bitship a 160-bit string. ad outputs SHAT: prachical * (=264) Possible routine la fid a second pre image: Imputi m Output: m' Choose - ER (0,1] REPEAT 1. 2. UNTIL hesh (m') = hash (m) fixed! 3. Return un 4 $exit - probibility = \frac{1}{2^{160}}$ and so the expected runtime = 2


Possible rombie la find a collision SofJ 10.12.08 6 Inpot: -Oulput: m, m'. 1. Le anpty List, it 0. 2. REPEAT 3. Choose m; Er [0, 13th, it it 1, deput mining to the ket. 4. UNTIL hush(mi) = hash(mi) for some j < i 5. Return (mi, m;). exid-probability = $\frac{i}{2^{160}}$ as expected run line $x = \frac{1}{2^{160}} = \sqrt{2^{1607}}$ That's much lærger than anything cloable nous adags. (By a factor ~ 1000 000.) Fact There æxists a procedure to fid a collision for SHAT which needs only 2 calls to SHAT. thus it's considered broken, HASAI but nobody did it so far. RISIS.

Signatures SofI Summary 16.12.08 (1) Example scheme: Elband type signatures: $a^{b}b^{s} = g^{Hash(m)}$ in G Elbamal signahues bus knoces : G= Zp, oul (g) = p-1. Schnor signatures, DSA $G = \mathbb{Z}_{g}^{\times}$, $\operatorname{well}(g) = \mathcal{C}$ + additional trick 1000.X to replace 5 by 5 x in the signature (thus saving space !) ECDSA G = an elliphi curve, either prime and P = l or a small (=25%) unaltiple of a prime

SofI (R) Security of a signature scheme 16.12.08 Setup Equi-s ovacle poly-time Si J - Public Roys of some participunts aj ET- CITA (a. m, s) Attackor's success: (a, m) hus merer been garica (b the aracle. (m, s) is a valid signature the public buy of. Our scheme is <u>secure</u> if no a flacher can win this game.



IPsec



- an then tication header AH

- encapsulating security payload. ESP E

AH Signature 1 inhysity authen tics by

ESP ertional encomption signature Emay be null] confidentiality anthe his authe histy (unless you use will encryption)

IP LAG AHI AHI # remaining hogs some fields change drening transpart A some hops, IP. src, IP-dest. NAT :

Soft trunel? Purpose : · confidentiality · integrity (· an the hicity)

Need a common key for all this!

where to get the common hey from?

Soft 17.12.08 (3) ESP ESP AH Task both enc Access control + + + Connection inhopsty + + Data anjin authentication + + Rejection of replay attacks (+)+ + Confidentia hity + + Limited Traffic Flow Confide Hality + + Building blocks / terminology seconty association SA ... = all connection related data stored by the communication partners, i'mparticular key material: · IP destination address · sequence number camber (32 bits) · sequence counter overflow · SPI secuity protocol idulihiar > AH reacryption only > ESP > to the

13.n.08 · used algon themes · Life time of SA (() (usually & hacars, 12 hours) Problematic issues NAT Harris 131.220. 4.3 Harris 131.220. 4.3 Harris 131.220. 4.3 my causes problems when trying to out he lice te source or destination IP. (With IPv6 no NATS are necessary, Hus IPr6 fans support ESP Firewalls II Frendl Amany many ather things a five wall filters packets according to the TCP port number. But if that is encrypted, as with iPsec + ESP, the this cannot be used ...

IPSEC & IKE

Michael Nüsken

25 June 2007

Before all: we are talking about a collection of protocols. Each partner of the exchange has to keep some information on the connection. This is in our context called the security association (SA). It contains specification about the algorithms that should be used for encryption and authentication, it contains keys for these, it may contain traffic selectors (filtering rules), and more. Each SA manages a simplex connection for one type of service. In each direction there will be an SA for the key exchange (IKE_SA) and one for the encapsulating security payload or for the authentication header. So each partner has to maintain at least four SAs. Such an SA is selected by an identifier, the socalled security parameter index (SPI). It is chosen randomly but so that it is unique.

1. IPsec

The secure internet protocol modifies the internet protocol slightly. We have the choice between transport and tunnel mode. In tunnel mode, an IP packet



is wrapped in with a new IP header and an IPsec header to


new IP header IPs	sec header	IP header	IP payload
----------------------	------------	-----------	------------

In transport mode, only the IPsec header is added:

IP header	IPsec header	IP payload
-----------	--------------	------------

There are two types of IPsec headers: the encapsulating security payload (ESP) and the authentication header (AH).

1.1. IPsec encapsulating security payload. The ESP specifies that and how its payload is encrypted and (optionally) authenticated. Actually, this 'header' is split into a part before and one after the data:



The security parameter index identifies the SA and thus all necessary algorithms and key material. To create the secured packet from the original one, it is first padded. Padding is used to enlarge the data length to a multiple of a block size that might be associated with the encryption. Traffic flow confidentiality (TFC) padding can be used to disguise the real size of the packet. Then the data is encrypted; in tunnel mode including the old IP header. To be precise, all the information from Payload data to Next header is encrypted. Next, a message authenticion code is calculated for this encrypted text and security parameter index, sequence number, initialization vector (IV) and possibly further padding; actually the message authentication code covers the entire packet but the header and the integrity check value plus the extended sequence number and integrity check padding if any.

1.2. IPsec authentication header. The AH authenticates its payload and also parts of the IP header. (Yes, this does violate the hierarchy.)

0			0				
IKE_SA initiator's SPI							
IKE_SA responder's SPI							
Next payload	Major version	Minor version	Exchange type	Х	Ι	VR	a x
Message ID							
Length							

2. Internet key exchange (version 2)

Any message in the internet key exchange starts with a header of the form

Clearly, the version is 2.0 with the present drafts (major version: 2, minor version: 0). The flags X are reserved, the I(nitiator) bit is set whenever the message comes from the initiator of the SA, the V(ersion) bit is set if the transmitter can support a higher major version, the R(esponse) bit is set if this message is a response to a message with this

Exchange type	Value
Reserved	0-33
IKE_SA_INIT	34
IKE_AUTH	35
CREATE_CHILD_SA	36
INFORMATIONAL	37
Reserved to IANA	38-239
Reserved for private use	240 - 255


Message ID. The header is usually followed by some payloads like

4 0 0 7 7 0 0 1 0	×	$\begin{array}{c} 9 \\ 110 \\ 112 \\ 112 \\ 113 \\ 114 \\ 115 \\ 115 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 18\\ 20\\ 22\\ 22\\ 22\\ 22\\ 22\\ 22\\ 23\\ 23\\ 23\\ 23$
Next payload	С	$\operatorname{Reserved}(0)$	Payload length
Payload			

The C(ritical) bit indicates that the payload is critical. In case the recipient does not support a critical payload it must reject the entire message. A non-critical payload can be simply skipped. All the payloads defined in RFC4306 are to be handled as critical ones whatever the C bit says.

Next payload	Notation	Value
None		0
RESERVED		1-32
Security Association	SA	33
Key Exchange	KE	34
Identification - Initiator	IDi	35
Identification - Responder	IDr	36
Certificate	CERT	37
Certificate Request	CERTREQ	38
Authentication	AUTH	39
Nonce	Ni, Nr	40
Notify	Ν	41
Delete	D	42
Vendor ID	V	43
Traffic Selector - Initiator	TSi	44
Traffic Selector - Responder	TSr	45
Encrypted	Е	46
Configuration	CP	47
Extensible Authentication	EAP	48
Reserved to IANA		49-127
Private use		128 - 255

2.1. Initial exchange.



PROTOCOL 2.1. IKE_SA_INIT.

1. Prepare SAi1, the four lists of supported cryptographic algorithms for Diffie-Hellman key exchange (groups), for the pseudo random function used to derive keys, for encryption, and for authentication. Guess the group for Diffie-Hellman and compute $KEi = g^a$.

Choose a nonce Ni.

Hdr, SAi1, KEi, Ni

2. Choose SAr1 from SAi1 unless no variant is supported.

Compute KEr = g^b if the group was guessed correctly. (Otherwise send:

```
Hdr, N(INVALID KE PAYLOAD, group)
```

.)

Choose a nonce Nr.


- Hdr, SAr 1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ]
- 3. Both parties now derive the session keys. We assume that prf is the selected pseudo random function which gets a key and a bit string as input.

 $\begin{aligned} & \text{SKEYSEED} = \text{prf}(Ni|Nr, g^{ab}), \\ & \text{SK_d}|\text{SK_ai}|\text{SK_ar}|\text{SK_ei}|\text{SK_er}|\text{SK_pi}|\text{SK_pr} \\ & = \text{prf}+(\text{SKEYSEED}, \text{Ni} | \text{Nr} | \text{SPIi} | \text{SPIr}) \end{aligned}$

where $\operatorname{prf}+(K,S) = T_1|T_2|T_3|\ldots$, and $T_1 = \operatorname{prf}(K,S|0x01)$, $T_i = \operatorname{prf}(K,T_{i-1}|S|i)$ for i > 1. SK_d is used for the derivation of keys in a child SA. SK_ai and SK_ei are used for authenticating and encrypting messages sent by the initiator, SK_ar and SK_er for messages sent by the responder.

4. The initiator send its identity IDi, optionally one or more certificates CERT, a certificate request CERTREQ (possibly including a list of trusted CAs), and optionally the responders identity IDr (it may be that the responder serves multiple identities 'behind' it).

Further she computes an authentication AUTH (using the key from the first CERT payload) for the entire first message concatenated with the responder's nonce Nr and the value prf(SK_pi, IDi). The authentication method can be RSA digital signature (1), shard key message integrity code (2), or DSS digital signature (3).



The initiator starts to negotiate a child SA in SAi 2 with proposed traffic selectors TSi, TSr.


	(IDi, [CERT,])
	[CERTREQ,]
Hdr, SK	[IDr,]
	AUTH, SAi 2,
	TSi, TSr

5. The responder sends its identity IDr, certificate(s). He computes an authentication AUTH for the entire second message concatenated with the initiator's nonce Ni and the value prf(SK_pr, IDr). Further he supplies the answer SAr 2 to the child SA creation and sends the accepted traffic selectors TSi, TSr.
Hdr, SK IDr, [CERT,]
AUTH, SAr 2,
TSi, TSr.

If this initial exchange is completed successfully the IKE_SA and a CHILD_SA are ready for use. Keying material for the childs is generated similar to the IKE_SA keys:

$$KEYMAT = prf + (SK d, Ni | Nr)$$

2.2. Creating additional child SAs. Further childs can be created under this IKE_SA using a CREATE_CHILD_SA exhange:



In case a CHILD_SA shall be rekeyed the notification payload N of type REKEY_SA specifies which SA is rekeyed. This can be used to established additional SAs as well as to rekey ages ones. Create new ones and afterwards delete the old ones. Also the IKE SA can be rekeyed similarly.


In a CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange including an optional Diffie-Hellman exchange new keying material uses also the new Diffie-Hellman key g^{ir} , it is concatenated left to the nonces. (Though the Diffie-Hellman key exchange is optional, it is recommended to either used it or at least to limit the number of uses of the original key.)

2.3. Denial of Service. If the server has a lot of half open connections (ie. the first message arrived, the second was sent but the third message is pending) it may choose to send a cookie first. (In order to defeat a denial of service attack.) It is suggested to use a stateless cookie consisting of a version identifier and a hash value of the initiator's nonce Ni, her IP IPi, her security parameter index SPIi and some secret:

$$Cookie = verID | hash(Ni, IPi, SPIi, secret_{verID})$$

This way the secret can be exchanged periodically, say every second, and the server only needs to store the last few (randomly) generated secrets.

The authentication AUTH then refers to the second version of the corresponding message, so the one including the cookie or responding to that, respectively. So the protocol becomes:



2.4. Extended authentication protocols. The initiator may leave out AUTH and thereby tell the responder that she wants to perform an extensible authentication which is then carried out immediately.

2.5. IP compression. The parties can negotiate IP compression.

2.6. ID payload. The ID payload

$\begin{array}{c} 330\\ 330\\ 330\\ 330\\ 330\\ 330\\ 330\\ 330$				
Next payload	С	$\operatorname{Reserved}(0)$	Payload length	
ID type	Reserved			
Identification data				

can be an IP address (ID type 1), a fully-qualified domain name string (2), a fully-qualified RFC822 email address string (3), an IPv6 address (5), an ASN.1 X.500 Distinguished Name [X.501] (9), an ASN.1 X.500 general name [X.509] (10), a vendor specific information (11).

2.7. CERT payload. The CERT payload

33222222222222222222222222222222222222				
Next payload	C Reserved (0)	Payload length		
Cert encoding	Certificate data			
Certificate data				

can be encoded in various widely used formats. Note that it can also carry revocation lists.


3. IKE version 1

The version 1 of the internet key exchange distinguishes between a main mode and an aggressive mode. Further it allows four variants in each mode depending on the desired type of authentication. Authentication can be based on

- public signature keys,
- public encryption keys, originial protocol,
- public encryption keys, revised protocol, or
- $\circ\,$ a pre-shared secret.

We only give the bare protocol summaries here, using notation similar to the one used for version 1. (They are not based on RFC240x but on the book ?.)

3.1. Main mode, public signature keys.




3.2. Aggressive mode, public signature keys.

	SAi, KEi, Ni, IDi	
ice	SAr, KEr, Nr, IDr, AUTH, [CERT]	qo
Al	$\underbrace{SK\left\{AUTH, [CERT]\right\}}$	Ð


	SAi	
Alice	SAr	
	KEi, ${\rm [Ni]}_{\rm Bob}$, ${\rm [IDi]}_{\rm Bob}$	
	KEr, $\{Nr\}_{Alice}$, $\{IDr\}_{Alice}$	Bob
	$SK = f(g^{ab}, Ni, Nr)$ SK {AUTH, [CERT]}	Ā
	SK {AUTH, [CERT]}	

3.3. Main mode, public encryption keys, original protocol.

3.4. Aggressive mode, public encryption keys, original protocol.




3.5. Main mode, public encryption keys, revised protocol.




3.6. Aggressive mode, public encryption keys, original protocol.

3.7. Main mode, pre-shared secret.



3.8. Aggressive mode, pre-shared secret.



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IKE History of SKIP PHOTORIS ISAKMP NSA groposed: Protocol labout / Key Managem L Security, (secured . Not really connection) · only frame work . ruled out both candidates IETT could take up the development OAKLEY, SKEME ... (now druths) Jih ISAKAP IKEN puts . no clear design Problem : too many variants · documentation: ≥ 150 papes 2 3 RFC & difficult to read.

5.41 IKE-2 · clear, simple rules . any request gets a response 1 ogtion, (outher than 8) . mihial exchange : 4 msge. + create dill A. 2 msgs. security association · all functionality of IKEV 1 is still there! easier analysis -7 Security questions Sec one? \bigcirc Session key agree ment. (1) · Howlong? Rundom? Do both parties contribute toit? . Man in the middle Perfect forward security (r) · Can an attacker decrypt given the long-term secrets after termination of the connection? Escrow boilage during the connection.

1402 Denial of service 3 How expensive is a half-open connection (half-ope = cuyting whil face then tice tion)? time, space, communication! Endpoint identifier hidring (4 . Does an eaveschapper get information about the idu tities? · Can an active effecte, get identify information of initiator as respanda? [Cannot have both 'no'! -> So choose lolecide what, if ever, is wanted. Design decision.] Live partner reassurance (5) · Replay ? Plancible demiability "6) · Does the protocol los prove - Mire Kalked? the t - Bob falked? - Alice talked to Bob? - Rob Julked to Alice?

. How is a logical date stream (3) Stream protection prokerd? - can fidentichty? - authenchicity? - integrity ? unchanged - integrity ? complete, correctorder, not too much Nego tracking copplo parameters (8) -> Pros -> lous ... Task (me'll do that komorrow) Answer these questions and classify pros and coms fa IKENT affressive moche IKENT main moche (م) [4] IKEV2. Q



. Man in the middle has no chance with pre-shared key and public key encryption

- Perfect Forward Security is assured through "short time" secrets
 Escrow Failage is prevented by the discrete log property of the "short time" secrets
- . An eavesdropper get no information about the identities with public key enaryption
- · Nonces prevent replay allacks
- · Assuming the key exchange created a secure session key, this implies the fullfillment of the three notions of stream protection
 - · less communication effort and faster key exchange them compared to the Main Mode

(IKE v. 1 main mode) 1. Key = hash (gdB, N:, Nr) - fixed size , both parties contribute . Man - In - the - middle - attack prevented by an therbication PFS: V SK based on NONCES Escrow foilage: possible if Nonce in deartest Ly only in main make , public signeture key ③ DOS possible (4) . Only if 10 is not encrypted =) hot the case! · Attacher can pretend to be the server -> She and Alice 10 in main mode , public sig key (5) Replay not possible due to the nonces (6) Each party can prove the ID of the other party (D) confidentiality : by endre encryption V authenticity by Signature 1 inlegity 8

1 K.E. 2 1. 4 monages for key exchange + Random ? -> Yes : use monces + KM + MIM ? - No : authentication 2. Perfect Forward Security > les, because remon keys are not based on secret keys (random «, p) 3. Dos -> possible half conin are expensive : KH generation + storage , monce 4. Endpoints are hidden (authentication material is encrypted) » if the attackern's mou achive 5. Yes, because of the nonces (live partmer reasurance) 6. Single messages are desirable, but both participants can prove that they talk to each other + Servion Keys are strong + mesistant to MIM + reply protection t extensible authinhishou support t compression NAT congestor not fixation

SofI Ś connection 13. 1.09 secure Diffie - Hellman key exchange need . "secure" group o good pseudo. vendom jenevakas Debian au han Ð indemention appement publie-key signatures dake exchange ·PKI (public key i'n frastruchure) social problems! -7 need FAST thing s fast encomption (⇒ symmetric) tast authentication ad integrity protection (> sy cume hic)

Fast energetion and another tice have

we have fast block ciphes:

plainker! 1786.75 key AES 256 + 128 eight kxt


How to use that kind of mini tive to encrypt long texts? -o Modes of Operation

Electronic Codebook Mode 7/01 0 plain plain + 128 + 128 + 128 - + 128 + 128 + 128 + 128 + 128 + 128 + 128 + 128


Kerckoffs' puinciple

50+I 14.1.05

cipho eipher cipher · same blacks we encoupted in the same way Problems ! - D'Large' structures remain visible danger of replacing or exchanging blocks undermay




SofI 14.1.09 $(\mathbf{2})$



For IPsec we don't come too much because a clever administrates will always authentication to deck for inlegate.


For Rec AES-CBC is one of the allowed encoppion algorithms. For fixed sized messages security of CBC cur be reduced to security of the used block cipher. Kuown: Proble : Our messages are not fixed size.



CTR couchermode 14.1.09 ctro chra AES Aest $p|c_{a} \rightarrow \bigoplus$ $p|c_{a} \rightarrow \bigoplus$ cipture cipture Use IV to define where to shart the counter (ad maybe how to increment it). Easy to decoppt and even in case the order is garbled. - security of CTR Known? can be reduced to security of the used block ciptur. A course nour it is easy to manipulate the plin text at will vuless there is an integrity check.

Authentication ? > lukeprity check?

14.2.09



[sof] One can (almost) prove that Fact: 14.1.09 this coustruction is secure -(-) of the used hach function is good. Horton hears a who? Horton's principle A signature (or authentication value) unst depend on the meaning of the message (ie. plaintext). - Dorder of eurryphion and authentication

More on a tacking MACS 504Ī 20.1.09 we have seen that the HMAC essentially pre- and postpends a single key to the message and hashes that. key ipad (2) tent opd+G 5 bash. Can't we do that sipler or more secure? I why not use differ I haps at the beginning G:ad the end? 2 Why not leave out this tial hay? 3 aby not leave out the final key? EXTENSION ATTACK. Neglecting the bash function's paddid Neglecting the bash function's paddid we can extend the text and adapt ad 3) the MAC. æ

Soft COLLISION ATTACKS on the ade 20.1.09 keyless hash function 2 If leave out the imitial bey then we can use a collesion of the heyless function to often a collision of the beyed version. So it is not - as it should be - much more difficult to a tack the keyed version. Security for (keyed) MAC for the attacker is successful of he can find a collision for I the MAC in thout knowing the bey. That - due to the ignorance of the keyis much more difficult than finding a collision for a hash function. ud PinDE& CONQUER ATTACK histerd of having to try ellipairs of (hey, key,) it is enough to try all keys key, and then all hey keys. Eg. with Repugth of key: being \$0 6it reeding 2 to operations, only 2.2° are enough with 1 200' 80, This is at course in practical, but it shows that it doesn't help.

5675 20.1.09 Bottom line 3 One can prove that (i) if some one breaks CBC-17AC then be can also break the underlying block cipher. (ii) if someone breaks HARC-hash the he can also break the underlying hash function. Now combine authentication ad encryption How to do this? Nell, recalling Horton's principle we should Att authenticate and then encrypt. and not EtA encrypt ad then an then ticke. Because with EtA we only anthemiticale He cycler hext. If an attacher is able to the cycler dext. If an attacher is able to exchange one of the encryption beys the recipient would not de dect a problem (unless Here is structure in the plaintext).

So 41 However, in ex. 10.2 we see that 20.1.89 Att may be bad as well. ۲ When ever we compine Lesson: primitives, we not align on their individual security but we have to reduce the security of the new construction to something difficult, eg. the security of the old canstruction. Psecfiktactually uses EtA. That seems to vio Lake Horton's principle. A may out of the Ett-problem would be to anthenticate, encomption key + eigher best. Beause this determines the plain best, the authentiaction now authenticates, the meaning of the glain text. And so this variation does not volate Horton's principte. After IKE there is a (strong), connection between encryption by and authentication key Actually, both are different sections of a certain pseudovandemak generated bit string. So you would have to break the pseudo random generater.

Teople started to Himk about [+0] securing à particules www connections. 21.1.09 1994 (?) Nelscape First steps : m> SSL. Decision : TCP IP SSLITLS wanted fast, easily embæddable solution. Reasons ! · should link application (web browses) to application (web serves) rather then station to station -EP ET / , wated: optional encryption, definitely authentication Psec was not yet there. and :

Shape of SSL (TLS : Sof I ALE Initial handshake 21.1.09 msg 1 I want to talk, ciphers I support, R_{Alice} Esession-iclos msg ? certificate, cipher I choose, R_{Bob} choose secret S, compute $K = f(S, R_{Alice}, R_{Bob})$ {S}Bob, {keyed hash of handshake msgs} Alice uss 3 Bob compute $K = f(S, R_{Alice}, R_{Bob})$ msg 4 {keyed hash of handshake msgs} data protected with keys derived from K Protocol 19-1. (simplified) SSLv3/TLS 6.7) SEpremasker key (6.7)Rice /RB.b = nonces (384 6.7) K = masker key 3.128 one part for encryption one for anthentication one for ? hash ('client finished' // K/ msg 182) T ^t depends an version Ke one (SSLV2, SSLV3, TLS+.0, chosen Sybob TICL TLS+.2 TLS 1. 1, TLS 1.2) hash ('server finished' K K M msg 122 (23?))

Now from K we derive 2 encorption boys, 2 authentiaction linkepity keys, 2 IV (for CBC or similar) one triple for each direction. 'Session resongtion' l'ext: optional session-id, ciphers. RAlice Jon o Lot and / an the session-id, cipher, R_{Bob} {keyed hash of msgs} {keyed hash of msgs}

Protocol 19-3. Session resumption if both sides remember session-id

this allows to upgrade to higher security primitives better Further purpose: US export restriction] US export restriction] (mex.allowed: 40-bit symmetric, (mex.allowed: 512 bit RSA) dropped meanwhile! [Background: SSL fulfilled this restriction by offering modes that publish 88 of R8 bits secret key.

possible cipla suites

| ,5, f] | 27.1.09 (5)

CipherSuite	Key Exchange	Cipher	Hash
TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL	NULL	NULL	NULL
TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5	RSA	NULL	MD5
TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA	RSA	NULL	SHA
TLS RSA WITH RC4 128_MD5	RSA	RC4 128	MD5
TLS RSA WITH RC4 128 SHA	RSA	RC4_128	SHA
TLS RSA WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA	RSA	IDEA CBC	SHA
TLS RSA WITH DES_CBC_SHA	RSA	DES_CBC	SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	RSA	3DES_EDE_CB	C SHA
TLS DH DSS WITH DES CBC SHA	DH_DSS	DES_CBC	SHA
TLS DH DSS WITH 3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	DH_DSS	3DES_EDE_CB	C SHA
TLS DH RSA WITH DES_CBC_SHA	DH_RSA	DES_CBC	SHA
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	DH_RSA	3DES_EDE_CB	C SHA
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA	DHE_DSS	DES_CBC	SHA
TLS_DHE_D <mark>SS_WITH_3DE</mark> S_EDE_CBC_SHA	DHE_DSS	3DES_EDE_CB	C SHA
TLS_DHE_R <mark>SA_WITH_DES</mark> _CBC_SHA	DHE_RSA	DES_CBC	SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	DHE_RSA	3DES_EDE_CB	C SHA
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5	DH_anon	RC4_128	MD5
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA	DH_anon	DES_CBC	SHA
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	DH_anon	3DES_EDE_CB	C SHA
Key			
Exchange			
Algonithm Decemintion		Kou siss	1 i m i t

Exchange Algorithm	Description	Key size limit
DHE_DSS DHE_RSA DH_anon DH_DSS DH_RSA NULL RSA	Ephemeral DH with DSS signatures Ephemeral DH with RSA signatures Anonymous DH, no signatures DH with DSS-based certificates DH with RSA-based certificates No key exchange RSA key exchange	None None None None RSA = none N/A None
11011	Non Key exchange	HOLE

Cipher	Туре	Key Material	Expanded Key Material	IV Size	Block Size
NULL	Stream	0	0	0	N/A
IDEA_CBC	Block	16	16	8	8
RC2_CBC_40	Block	5	16	8	8
RC4_40	Stream	. 5	16	0	N/A
RC4_128	Stream	16	16	0	N/A
DES40_CBC	Block	5	8	8	8
DES_CBC	Block	8	8	8	8
3DES_EDE_CBC	Block	24	24	8	8

each suite is a combination. Note: So one can rule out bad combination. (Other than the IKE procedure.) 2: Session key ajocement - need PKI, application much have root certificates!


, Perfect forward security ? Escrew attack ? [-of] 21.1.09 We do not have with RSA-currphed (6) S sent to Bob! Having Bob's secret encryption key (langthen) Having Bob's secret encryption key (langthen) the atlacker sight decrypts {53305. $. D_{o} S?$ - No extra protection (shill?) not that important because the connection relies on lower protocals that have Dos protection. . Endpoint id hidig · Server is always known publicly . Chient is always prokered. · live parties reassorance? Nouces Ratice, Bot prevent replays... Additionally: - different lays for all front directions · message numbers Demasility · Stream protection Negotiate compto params . No !


Encryption & authentication in TLS ------ integrity key HMAC 🖛 record data record header sequence num HMAC pad record data record header encryption key encrypt encrypted integrity-protected record record header Figure 19-4. Cryptographically protected record format . sequence un is autherticated but never sent! . all header date is authenticated. Note: · ALE .

Authentication in a network 5071 · Is office ellowed to access the file Wonder land on the harddrive Babbit? May Mice use the printer Black Caucen? · Mary Mice send mail to Boboy? Bobby Babb.7 ? 7 Wonderd Alice Black Queen 1= You do all the B's know that whether a specific A (eg Alice) has the associated printege /right?

Problems (a) unthenticate Alice ~ all the B's meed all the A keys (5) privilige management ~ administration needs to (re) inform / configure each B separately. (c) cach pair A-B needs a shared key for fast secured data exchange. a trushed third party, Possible solution : key distribution center

Idea :






Sof I Prost cous! 27.1.09 few keys stored at one place only 3 + (Hisceneeds K and the bey center needs all keys) + (re) configuration at one place each pair thice - Bob gets a shart-lived + Gersion key whenever needed (and allowed) single paint of tailage (if key ander is down, nothing works) performance belleneck initial effort far setup is large Ŧ if the key is correpted all authenticution is lost. Actually, the key center can in personale every one.

The cons may weakened by duphicating He key center

+ each user only needs to conthen ticate once to the key conter.

Actually, we do it slightly different.



Protocol 11-17. KDC operation (in practice)

Here, a traiter can just replay the blind

message


Needham-Schroeder protocol


Protocol 11-18. Needham-Schroeder

Na nonce that grants that the supposed key center has the shared key KALice. No monce that grants to Alice that she is halking to Bob. nonce that prevent cams to provent veplays Nz . that grants to Bob that is falking to Alice.


Soft Wandsing : one could think of a replay a tacker 27.1.09 that uses parts of message 4 to obtain a valid answer was mersages. (Idea: start a second comechin with ticket, WAR (N33.) That is prevented if each message has an integrity check! A further a fack comes when Trucky, the tranter, is able to shal Alice' key and get a bunch of tickets before Alice volice and revokes her day (and logs in aven to the key anter). Problem: the fickets stay valid.

A possible solution to this problem !





Protocol 11-19. Expanded Needham-Schroeder



(time out


Protocol 11-20. Otway-Rees

KAB{anything recognizable}


4

5

The Kerberos authentication service (see Chapter 13 Kerberos V4) is roughly based on the Needham-Schroeder protocol. It looks a lot simpler than these protocols because it assumes a universal idea of time, and includes expiration dates in messages. The basic Kerberos protocol is:



Protocol 11-21. Kerberos




Sofi Kerberos VS 28. 1.09 · Needhan - Schwoeder : 1979(?) History · Kerberos was developped after : the early 1980s, V5 i the early 1990s. R = C 4120 : Jaly 2005. even here : only 4 out of 139 pages deal with security considerations. 'Own' security remarks: · "By itself Karberos claes not provide au thentication. Devial af Service a Hacks are not solved. · interopresability conflicts tassmond - quessing The tickets are devived from password in away that allows offling dictionary adacks. (Passive!) 14 only used DES-CBC-MDS. VS still has DES-CBC-MDS as a SHOULD. Derg Everything relies en synchronized - Aller

2077 - No identifier hickory. 28.109 - No perfect forward security. 2 Schneier en Kerberos securite - source replay seem passible, in particular if a ticket life time has not expired or our manipulate clocks - ilerberos (ær ang such system) is volnerable la malorare. security model? . attacks to Needham -Schroeder _owe (us seen yesterday) · formulated à alcange that he proved secure in a certain model. Needham - Schooeder - Lowe publicher is shill insecure in grachice version Warinschi

SofI key enter 28.1.09 Aladre. 305 The attacker transports all messages. The is question to correct some (but not all) The is question to correct some (but not all) prefies. probles. Aim: Mutual authention of Alice and Bob, Allacker tries to 'perform' an au thurtication to Alice a to Bob without corrupting ang of the two. For any asymmetric encorption scheme Needham-Schooeder basedau, F Thin is ruse cure secure Neve exists an asymmetric encomption scheme such that Needham-Schroeder-Lowe is still insecure. Then ElGamel encryption scheme

Vien 15 we base Needkam-Schweder-Lowe) -of J on a IND-CCA secure asymmetric (4) encomption scheme then it is secure in the above sense For un encomption scheme ND-CCA secure means that the atadees cannot distinguish two self chosen messages even if bit is allowed to get messages ciptertexts decompted:



jele,13 boal: i=j zjele,13 & cism

& cis never quericeto the decomption oracle.

IND-CCA secure means that there is no successful goly time a Hackes.

El band encryption Global satup: a group 6, an element g (5) of known order 9 (soch the TL with basis g is difficult?) secret key & E Zg, Personal server: public key a = g EG » Alice Bob (temperature secret) $t = g^{T} \in G$ $y = a^{-x} \qquad (t,y)$ -> t⁻ y " * This scheme obviously (?) is not IND-CCA secure. The affectives chooses mo, ma different, Prof and asks for an encryption c= (t, y) of one of them. Then he computes $c^{\star} = (g^{s}t, a^{s}y)$ and asks the deary phion or acke for its decryption mt. So he can see whether it was

However, one can prove that it is IND-CPA secure.

Overview Primitives Symmetric Eucoyption (AES,...) Confridantiality Message Authentication Codes lutegost ey HMAC-SHAT AES-CBC-MAC Authenticity (UhDeniability)

Soft 3.2.09 (1)

Public -key

Encryption ((RSA))Elbamal encomption, ...)

Signature (El Gama / type signa eg: Elbanal, DSA, ECDA, (Schwarg)

---)

Diffir - Hellman


Key agreement

Figerprint

Hask functions: SHAZ

ALGORITHM. SHA-1. Input: A message $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$. Output: A hash value $H \in \{0, 1\}^{160}$.

Constants and round functions:



Protocols

Psec/INE 2

Ē

+ Certificates/PKI

DH + Authentication + Symm. Enc.

TLS |SSL =

と

SSH ≈

Kerberos


Rublic encryption + Sym. Enc. + MAC.

MAC

2 76 P

Public encryption, public by signatures, Symm. encomptions.

Struc tures PKI ~



Root CA (Ae----

2 Signatures + Certificales + Trust Rules keyserver (+ keyservers) Sot2 Web of trust 3.2.09 " Ancaschy model" (PGP)ther esite City C Solutions citizen portals ("Bûrperportal") · electronic bankig (" old ") - dechicated solutions - TLS/Slame http. · (secure email) . virhal private networks "lokea" labors health card card I D L & Card L & · clectronic health card + intrastructure Need an onymity and ven hiability. . (electronic elections) · (bankij and) · electronic passports and id-cards. · C Commerce (usually just TLS/SSL over http)

Sofl final cut: The Security? Security model : For encryphian: Selop (IND-CRA) decration **c*** Attached eacryphon often m 7 7 poly-Hune i ez soris 1x j e 10,13 Goal: i=j 1 Security uption: There is no such a tacker. Helpful for finalis · necessary conchriens · sufficient conditions (security reductions)

SofI 3.2.05 For signatures: Setup ٢ S EF-CMA signing oracle m* offer (poly-Hime) 5* Goal: (m,s) isavalid signature querie d me ver 8 щ (m, s) There is no such a Hacker. Security wohion :

Your questions: Repeat major issues (4) - Poklig - Hellman - Pollados, Baby-Skp-leiant-Skp - Chinese Remainder Algorithm (\mathbf{i}) - Psec - Modes of aporation - Security notions (3) - Key Exchange Threads

m, a are coprime then 14 CRT Zm -> Zm x Zn is an isomerphism. (a mod min) has (a mod m, a mod n) $\frac{2}{2} \frac{2}{1} \frac{2}{1} \frac{2}{1} \frac{2}{1} \frac{2}{1} \frac{1}{10} \frac{2}{7} \frac{1}{10} \frac{2}{7} \frac{1}{10} \frac{2}{7} \frac{1}{10} \frac{2}{7} \frac{1}{10} \frac{2}{7} \frac{1}{10} \frac{1}{7} \frac{1}{10} \frac{1}{10}$ compatible mille +, . $\frac{1}{2} \frac{2}{3}$ \mathcal{K}_{q}

DLP: give $g, q \in G$ Jind $x \in \mathbb{Z}_{ord}(g)$ such that (2, 2, 0) g' = qPoklig - Hellman . uses the factorization of ord (g) to break down the DLP to easier instances. If $g^{k} = \alpha$ then $(g^{k})^{k} = a^{k}$. Choose nice $k \leq 1$ Best: $\frac{\operatorname{curl}(g)}{k}$ is prime k in case $k \mid \operatorname{ard}(g)$. W The new problem determines & modulo and (gk). Altogetter we can abtain a med p for any pland(g). Acheally, gove can extend that to a mod pe darang pelard(g) by writing α in here p = (Dekails...)ad choosing $k = \frac{\operatorname{ord}(g)}{p^{f}}$ for f = 7, 2, 3, ... e. Overall runhime : Ze: DLP(p:) where and (g) : (O(DLP(Consol prime)) TTPE:

To solve DLPs in general and Soft 4.7.09 i particular if and (g) is grime Pollord-9 use Baby - Step - Gial - Step . 0--la baby-piart we write q = ord(g). x = da · Vai + do ad consider $\left(g^{\overline{V_{q}}^{T}}\right)^{d_{q}} = g^{-d_{0}}$ $g^{-d_{0}}$ So we only need rentime O(Vq). Improvem +: Pollardog including Floyd's hick. - Dominie : expected O(V7). memory! O(7)

Soft Modes of operation We have block ciphers, many good ares. They can encompt a fixed sited block Using a (fixed cited) bey. We need to construct cipters that can encrypt arboilmanily long messages. " from short to long" Various solution: ECB : We should prove: if this can be a tacked the a single block cipher entity alithe can be a tacked. ECB is weak because it will reveal some patterns in the message ... CBC essen hally EFT ---> EFT ---> EFT CTR along preudorendo

Threads & Security

Various a Hack aims:

· Perfect Forward Security

, Escron foilage

×+1 4.2.05

· Identifier Hiding · Donial of Service

Security Notions -- see yesterday.

Psec see notes of 13 January ...