You have encountered several levels of security:

- Unbreakability,
- Universal Unforgeability,
- Existential Unforgeability (EUF);

along with different means for an attacker:

- Key-Only Attack,
- Non-adaptive Chosen Message Attack,
- Chosen Message Attack (CMA).

Pairing an adversarial goal with an attack model defines a security notion, e.g. EUF-CMA.

**Exercise 10.1. Security notions (4 points)**

Consider the ElGamal signature scheme. Assume that the DL is hard and decide for each of the 9 security notions whether the scheme is

- secure,
- not secure
- or the answer is unknown.
What can you say, if you assume that DL is easy? Use the connections between the security notions to simplify your argument.

**Exercise 10.2** (Security reduction). (3 points) For a signature scheme, a message is first hashed and then the hash value is signed. Assume that the signature scheme is secure in the EUF-CMA model. Does that imply that the hash function is collision resistant? Prove your answer.

**Exercise 10.3** (Generating $r$-safe RSA moduli). (5 points) An example for an $r$-safe modulus $pq$ is given by SOPHIE-GERMAIN primes $p = 2u + 1$, where $u > r$ is also prime, and similarly for $q$. It is conjectured, but not proven, that there are infinitely many SOPHIE-GERMAIN primes.

(i) Write a small program that picks on input $r$ and $x$ random integers $a \leq x$ until $a$ is a Sophie-Germain prime $2u + 1$ with $u > r$. Run your program for $r = 2^{10}$, $x = 2^{60}$ several times to get a good estimate for the expected number of picks. Repeat the experiment with increasing $x$, say by factors of 2, to get an idea for the behaviour as $x$ increases. Compare the behaviour to $x/\log^2 x$.

(ii) Modify your program to find primes $p$ where $(p - 1)/2$ has no prime factor smaller than $r$. How many loops do you observe on average for $r = 2^{10}$ and $x = 2^{60}$?

As above, study the behaviour for increasing $x$ and compare it to $x/\log^2 x$. 

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